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New cryptographic techniques such as homomorphic encryption (HE) allow computations to be outsourced
to and evaluated blindfolded in a resourceful cloud. These computations often require private data owned by
multiple participants, engaging in joint evaluation of some functions. For example, Genome-Wide Association
Study (GWAS) is becoming feasible because of recent proliferation of genome sequencing technology. Due
to the sensitivity of genomic data, these data should be encrypted using different keys. However, supporting
computation on ciphertexts encrypted under multiple keys is a non-trivial task. In this paper, we present a
comprehensive survey on different state-of-the-art cryptographic techniques and schemes that are commonly
used. We review techniques and schemes including Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE), Proxy Re-Encryption
(PRE), Threshold Homomorphic Encryption (ThHE), and Multi-Key Homomorphic Encryption (MKHE). We
analyze them based on different system and security models, and examine their complexities. We share lessons
learned and draw observations for designing better schemes with reduced overheads.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Modern data-driven applications involve highly sensitive data such as genome sequences [99],
biometric data including iris scans and fingerprints [103], and location data and information of
users’ whereabouts [63]. These data are hard to change, sometime irreplaceable, once exposed.
Therefore, privacy enhancing techniques have to be applied in order to ensure the privacy of user data.
Conventional encryption protects data in-transit and in-storage. However, data has to be decrypted
before performing any computation on it. Advanced encryption technique is needed to extend the
protection of user data during computation; that is, in-use.
Homomorphic encryption (HE) supports arithmetic operations, such as addition and multiplication,
on encrypted data without decrypting it first. Specifically, given two messages m and m′ and
homomorphic addition and multiplication operations ⊕ and ⊗, we have Enc(m) ⊕ Enc(m′) which
decrypts to m + m′ and Enc(m) ⊗ Enc(m′) which decrypts to m × m′. For simplicity, we will
use normal arithmetic operators to represent homomorphic operations in the rest of the paper.
Generally speaking, any algorithm that can be reduced to just these arithmetic operations can be
homomorphically evaluated on encrypted data. Logic gates, such as AND, OR, XOR, and NOT,
can be translated into arithmetic forms; for example, XOR(x ,y) = x + y − 2xy if x ,y ∈ Z, or
simply XOR(x, y) = x + y if x ,y ∈ Z2. Additionally, checking equality of two numbers x ,y ∈ Z
can be performed as EQ(x ,y) = ∏(XNOR(xi ,yi )) where xi ,yi are bits of the input numbers and
XNOR(xi ,yi ) = NOT(OR(xi ,yi )), or simply EQ(x ,y) = x + y + 1 if x ,y ∈ Z2. The first set of HE
schemes [10, 47, 59, 77] only realized partial homomorphisim, which supports either addition or
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2 Aloufi et al.
multiplication on ciphertexts but not both, such as Paillier [77] and ElGamal [47] schemes. Boneh-
Goh-Nissim scheme [17] supports arbitrary number of additions and a single multiplication; hence,
it is somewhat homomorphic. There are leveled HE schemes which support a predetermined number
of multiplications based on the targeted function. In 2009, Gentry [54] proposed the first plausible
construction to achieve a fully HE (FHE) scheme based on ideal lattices that can support arbitrary
number of additions and multiplications. Homomorphic addition is performed almost free of cost but
multiplication significantly increases the noise elements in the ciphertext. Hence, it is important to
reduce the multiplicative depth (i.e., consecutive multiplications) of a homomorphic function. When
the noise growth in the ciphertext is too large, it is not possible to retrieve the correct message after
decryption. Gentry’s FHE scheme, which was built on a leveled HE scheme, can homomorphically
evaluate its own decryption circuit in a bootstrapping step. Hence, it can refresh the encryption of an
evaluated ciphertext, when the noise level reaches a defined threshold, to obtain a fresh ciphertext
with small noise. In practice, the bootstrapping step is computationally expensive; therefore, most
applications sufficiently use a leveled HE scheme. Also, HE schemes can be designed to be either
symmetric (uses one key to encrypt and decrypt) or asymmetric (uses one key pair, a public key to
encrypt and a secret key to decrypt).
1.1 System and security models for secure computation
An ideal form of secure computation is to send the sensitive data to a trusted party, who performs
the computations and returns the result. However, the existence of this trusted party is not always
possible especially with frequent security breaches and possibility of participants’ corruption. In a
practical setting, the security of constructed protocols is emulated to the security of an ideal model,
following the Ideal/Real model paradigm [68]. In other words, we focus on a security model which
considers the existence of semi-honest or malicious adversaries.
The ability to compute while encrypted allows sensitive data to be outsourced for computations
without compromising privacy. This ability enables many applications to be designed based on
different system models, as illustrated in Fig. 1. These system models are often referred to as
coopetitive [1, 105] models (i.e., cooperation in the presence of competition). The simplest system
model for secure outsourced computation is in a two-party setting (Fig. 1a) where Alice wants Bob
to perform a computation f (x ,y), where f is a function or a trained machine learning model, on
sensitive inputs x and y owned by them without revealing the data to each other. In this case, Alice
encrypts the input [x] under her public key and sends it to Bob, who homomorphically computes the
function f on the inputs [x],y and returns the encrypted result [f (x ,y)] to Alice. Alice can decrypt
the evaluated results using her private key. In this system model, user data privacy is protected against
passive adversary by encryption as long as the function f does not leak information about Bob’s
input y. For some leaky functions such as summing two input numbers, HE primitives do not prevent
leakage.
The two-party setting can be extended to a more general setting, secure outsourced computation
among multiple parties. As illustrated in Fig. 1b, multiple parties may want to perform a joint
computation on their encrypted data without revealing sensitive data to each others. This computation
model is often based on interactive secure multi-party computation (MPC) protocols, which are
characterized by the high communication overhead and require participation of all the parties during
the computation.
There is an emerging system model which supports non-interactive computations and better suits
the cloud computing model because data owners delegate computations on their data to a private or
public cloud, as shown in Fig. 1c. Although there are existing work [19, 20, 31, 103] on outsourcing
homomorphic computations to the cloud, these works focus on settings similar to the two-party
setting; that is, the computations are performed on data from one data owner. In this paper, we focus
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Fig. 1. System models for secure computation.
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Fig. 2. Timeline featuring recent developments in HE schemes.
on a more challenging computation model in which multiple parties delegate their sensitive data or
functions to the cloud. The cloud is an evaluator of some functions and should not learn anything
from the encrypted data. Similar to previous system models, data owners do not want to reveal their
data to others. To ensure user data privacy, encrypting data using a single key is not very practical in
many application scenarios. Can we realize a secure computation model in which data are encrypted
using different keys of the corresponding owners? This cloud-friendly computation model has been
discussed in previous literature [76, 90]. However, it has not been realized due to the challenges in
supporting homomorphic evaluation on data encrypted under different keys, in addition to issues in
key management and lack of efficient decryption protocols. Note, we focus on the system model in
Fig. 1c and assume inputs are encrypted under their owners’ keys, but we do not define under which
key the result [f (x ,y)] is encrypted for now. We will be specific about this key in the subsequent
sections when we review different approaches.
To the best of our knowledge, none of existing surveys provide a comprehensive review on how
to support efficient homomorphic computations on encrypted data under multiple keys in the new
computation model we discussed earlier. In this survey, our goal is to fill this gap and provide a
comprehensive review, analysis, and lesson-learned of the state-of-the-art multi-key homomorphic
encryption techniques for secure computation outsourcing.
1.2 Computing with different keys
Spanning over the last 40 years, there are many homomorphic encryption schemes, each provides
different supports for performing arithmetic operations on homomorphically encrypted data. Figure 2
shows a timeline of different types of HE schemes (improved based on [3, 101]), including recent
schemes that support homomorphic computations on encrypted data under multiple keys.
Manuscript submitted to ACM CSUR.
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Fig. 3. Taxonomy of techniques for secure computation on encrypted data.
In this paper, we review and categorize these techniques according to how the multiple keys are
used to secure data and how homomorphic computations are supported. Figure 3 shows a taxonomy
of these surveyed techniques within this paper. Generally speaking, they can be roughly divided into
two categories:
- A subset of these techniques is based on a single key, where ciphertexts are encrypted under a key
owned by a single party at all times and decrypted using the corresponding secret key or can be
made decryptable under another key. Most existing works on HE assumed data encrypted under
a single key. However, it is clearly impractical in our coopetitive system models illustrated in
Fig. 1. Another example of single key schemes but offering additional functionalities is Proxy
Re-Encryption (PRE) technique [12, 102] that transforms a stored ciphertext ci = Enc(pki ,m) into
a ciphertext c j = ReEncrypt(rkpki→pkj , ci ) that is decrypted by authorized user’s secret key skj .
Also, there are Identity-based encryption (IBE) [15] and Attribute-based encryption (ABE) [85]
schemes that provide access control mechanisms where data can be decrypted by authorized keys
generated based on the user’s identity or attributes.
- On the other hand, multiple keys may be involved in the encryption of ciphertexts and required to
contribute to its decryption. Threshold HE (ThHE) [8] and Multi-key HE (MKHE) are examples
of these techniques. An example of the latter allows the ciphertext ci , encrypted under pki , to be
extended to an additional key pkj such that c¯ = Enc({pki , pkj },m). The message can be retrieved
when using the two corresponding secret keysm = Dec({ski , skj }, c¯). Recently, there is a hybrid
approach [4] which combines the advantages of both threshold and multi-key HE with a goal to
reduce computation complexity and ciphertext size.
1.3 Related work
As discussed before, many surveys focused on secure outsourced computation techniques [90, 96,
101] and the construction of HE schemes [3, 51, 72, 97]. There is a notable lack in the literature for
detailed review on secure outsourced computation with different keys in the coopetitve system model.
Tang et al. [96] focused on threat modeling for secure outsourced computation and studied techniques
to realize security requirements including confidentiality, integrity, privacy, and access control.
Techniques with different keys were studied only for data sharing in the cloud and did not address
supporting homomorphic computations on encrypted data. Secure outsourcing of fundamental and
application-specific homomorphic computations based on a single key were surveyed in [90, 101].
On the other hand, extensive reviews of the HE schemes construction have been provided both
from engineering [72] and theoretical [3, 52] perspectives. Unfortunately, existing survey articles
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did not discuss extended HE schemes, such as ThHE and MKHE, which support computing with
multiple keys. Particularly, these multi-key techniques are witnessing rapid development in recent
years as can be observed in Fig. 2. Some proposed MKHE work [4, 30, 65] give brief analysis of
related work. A more-in-depth review [18] studied the first two MKHE constructions (i.e., LaTV12,
CM15). Overall, no existing survey provides detailed analysis and categorization of state-of-the-art
multi-key approaches, which is a primary aim of our survey.
1.4 Contributions and organization
In this paper, we fill the gap in the literature and conduct a comprehensive survey on cryptographic
techniques that enable multiple parties to compute on their data encrypted under multiple keys. In
particular, we investigate design trends in the state-of-the-art schemes for different system and threat
models. We share lesson learned and discuss new directions that is yet to be explored to achieve more
practical solutions for secure computation outsourcing. We discuss potential applications that can be
benefit from the ability of homomorphically computing on encrypted data under multiple keys.
The rest of this survey is organized as follows. Different system models and security models
for secure computation is defined in Section 2. After that, preliminaries and HE commonly used
techniques are presented in Section 3. Single-key approaches such as attribute-based encryption and
proxy re-encryption are presented in Section 4. Following that, the multi-key approaches, threshold
HE, multi-key HE, and hybrid approaches are discussed in Section 5. In Section 6, we share lesson
learned and open research directions. In Section 7, we review application scenarios for computation
on data with multiple keys. Finally, Section 8 concludes the survey.
2 SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS
To design a secure protocol, we need to determine possible attacks that target a system model. Adver-
saries who launch the attacks often aim to compromise security requirements such as confidentiality,
integrity, and availability. It is essential to understand these threats and their impacts on the security
during threat modeling. In often cases, malicious adversaries can launch arbitrary attacks that deviates
from the protocol, and it is difficult to protect against every threat. Moreover, some countermeasures
may be computationally-intensive and affect the practicality of the protocol. Hence, we make security
assumptions as a trade-off for efficiency. For example, we assume system users are semi-honest,
i.e., they strictly follow the protocol specifications. Careful design of the security model is critical
to achieving secure yet practical protocol for a given system model. In the rest of this section, we
discuss the security model of a system in more details, including modeling potential threats and
specifying the appropriate security requirements and assumptions.
2.1 Threat model
Threat modeling is the process of identifying potential vulnerabilities, circumstances, and actions in
which a capable adversary can compromise the security of the system [94]. In the system models
illustrated in Fig. 1, an adversary can be either an internal or external. An internal adversary is a
participant in the protocol, e.g., Bob in the multi-party setting in Fig. 1b, and may want to learn
confidential information of other users. On the other hand, an external adversary may intercepts or
corrupts system users, such as colluding with the cloud evaluator, with the intention to breach the
privacy of other users. Moreover, adversaries are assumed to be either semi-honest, or malicious.
A passive adversary in the semi-honest setting, say the cloud evaluator, follows the protocol
execution and does not attempt to cheat; however, it passively collects the transmitted inputs and
tries to infer useful information about the data owners. It is difficult to detect this type of passive
attacks because no abnormal behaviour is observed [86]. Hence, it is fundamental that any secure
protocol has to provide defense, rather than detection, against such passive adversary attacks.
Manuscript submitted to ACM CSUR.
6 Aloufi et al.
Unlike passive adversaries, active or malicious adversary can launch arbitrary attacks such as
deviating from the protocol’s specifications. A malicious cloud evaluator may use homomorphic
proprieties to alter ciphertexts without decryption, or simply corrupt them. Active attacks may also
take other forms to breach security, such as corrupting and impersonating authorized system users
and feeding new or changed inputs to the protocol, or interfering with the communication channel by
delaying and replaying messages. A system model is proven to be secure if it applies countermeasures
against any possible attack defined in the threat model and launched by any corrupted user. But, it is
often computationally expensive to account for all possible attacks.
2.2 Security requirements
Security requirements include the confidentiality and privacy of system inputs, the integrity of
data and correctness of the evaluation, and the availability of data for authorized users. In threat
modeling, attacks are often categorized based on which requirement they target. Subsequently,
cryptographic primitives are applied to meet those requirements. Data confidentiality can be ensured
by encryption, especially with those that offer semantic security, i.e., the ciphertext does not leak
information about its plaintext. Data integrity can be checked by obliviously verifying data inputs.
Suppose a classification protocol that requires users’ inputs to be in the range {0, 1}, and maliciously
providing inputs not in this range may leak information about the evaluation model [100]. To ensure
integrity, each user must send additional information, in the form of Zero-Knowledge proofs, with
their encrypted inputs to prove that the inputs are indeed valid without revealing them. Similarly,
correctness of evaluation can be checked to prevent corrupted evaluator from applying unwanted
functions. For example, the evaluation of a function can be represented as a graph with each
computation as a node associated with a hash value. The correctness can be checked by running a
proof, using zkSNARKs techniques [9], with the hash values generated during the evaluation.
Another important requirement for security is key management. The life cycle of cryptographic
keys includes generation, distribution, storage, use, and revocation. It is vital to carefully manage
keys through each of these phases because poor key management can easily defeats the purpose of
using cryptography [49]. In key generation, cryptographic parameters such as key bit-length must
be chosen appropriately based on a security parameter λ to protect against known attacks such as
brute-force attack. Generated secret keys must be kept private by their rightful owners. Owners may
provide information about their secret keys in a form of evaluation keys to perform homomorphic
techniques like key switching or bootstrapping (discussed in Sec. 3.3). Those evaluation keys must
be securely distributed and stored under encryption. The keys, or key pairs, should also be properly
revoked when expired or changed across the system. Throughout this survey, we will focus on the
case of asymmetric cryptosystems that generates key pairs, but the key management also applies to
symmetric cryptosystems.
2.3 Security assumptions
Secure protocols must take countermeasures against possible attacks. As mentioned, modeling threats
and defining security requirements are two essential steps. However, designing for a practical setting
often faces a trade-off between security and efficiency. Therefore, it is common to make security
assumptions to achieve a more efficient design. For example, many HE schemes base their security on
the Learning with Errors (LWE) problem (formally defined in Sec. 3.1). But studies show it is more
efficient to operate in a ring of polynomials instead of matrices, which enables Single Instruction
Multiple Data (SIMD) operations. Many recent HE schemes that show practical performance have
their ring variant constructed under the ring-LWE assumption. Another example is in the distributed
decryption process of a Threshold HE scheme [8]. In this scheme, N participants create a joint public
key, such that pk∗ = (pk1 + · · · + pkN ), and use it for encryption. The corresponding secret key is
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Table 1. Description of notations used throughout the survey.
Category Notation Description
General
a A vector of n elements where ai = a[i] is the i-th element.
B A matrix of elements where bi, j is the j-th element of the i-th row.
⟨a,b⟩ The dot-product of the two vectors a,b as ⟨a,b⟩ = ∑ni=1(aibi ).
N Total number of users in the system.
(R)LWE-specific
Φ(x) A cyclotomic polynomial Φ(X ) = Xd + 1, where d is a power of 2.
R A ring over polynomials with integer coefficients R = Z[X ]/(Φ(X )).
Rt The ring of polynomials with coefficients in Zt , where t is plaintext modulus.
Rq The ring of polynomials with coefficients in Zq , where q is ciphertext modulus.
ψ The key distribution over R.
χ The noise distribution over R or Z with small standard deviation.
HE Scheme-specific
pki HE public key of the i-th user.
ski HE secret key of the i-th user.
eki HE evaluation key of the i-th user.
[m]i HE encryption of a messagem under pki . Also denoted as c
secretly shared among the N participants. Thus, users must jointly construct the secret key in order
to decrypt. There are two assumptions that are considered for this case. First, we may assume the
presence of at most N − 1 corrupted users. Similar to (N ,N ) secret sharing schemes [88], this means
all N users are required to participate in the decryption; otherwise, the ciphertext will not be correctly
decrypted. This design is based on the dishonest-majority assumption. The second assumption is
the honest-majority assumption, which relaxes the security to achieve efficiency. It allows a subset
T < N of the participants to reconstruct the corresponding secret key and collaboratively decrypt the
ciphertext, i.e., (T ,N ) scheme.
3 PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we define notations and definitions that will be used throughout this survey and
provide background on general homomorphic primitives and techniques used in HE schemes.
3.1 Notations and definitions
We denote vectors as bold lowercase, such as a, and matrices as bold uppercase B. Specifically, given
a vector a = (a1, . . . ,an), we define a[i] = ai as the i-th element. Let n×n′ be the matrix dimensions
and B[i, j] be the j-th element of the i-th row. The dot product of the two vectors a,b is denoted
by ⟨a,b⟩ = ∑ni=1 a[i] · b[i], and the tensor product is denoted by a ⊗ b. The multiplication of two
elements a,b is denoted by ab or a · b. For an element a ∈ R, ⌊a⌉ denotes the rounding to its nearest
integer, and ⌈a⌉ , ⌊a⌋ denote the rounding up and down, respectively. For a symmetric (asymmetric)
encryption scheme, we denote the secret key and the public and private key pair as sk and (pk, sk),
respectively. For scheme-specific notations, we will introduce them when needed in the subsequent
sections.
DEFINITION 1 (LEARNING WITH ERRORS (LWE) [84]). For a security parameter λ, let n = n(λ)
be a dimension, q = q(λ) ≥ 2 be an integer, and χ = χ (λ) be an error distribution over Z. For
a secret s ∈ Znq , let D be a distribution obtained by uniformly sampling a←Znq and e ← χ and
setting the pair as (a,b = ⟨a, s⟩ + e). Let U be the uniform distribution over Zn+1q . The (decisional)
LWE problem is to distinguish between the two distributions D and U for a fixed secret s sampled
according to a key distributionψ = ψ (λ) over Znq .
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The LWE problem operates in the n-dimensional integer space Znq and consists of vectors and
matrices. To achieve more efficient computations, the problem can be extended to rings of polyno-
mials with integer coefficient. The aim is significantly reduce the dimension, such that n = 1, and
correspondingly the size of keys and ciphertexts.
DEFINITION 2 (RING LEARNING WITH ERRORS (RLWE) [71]). For a security parameter λ,
let Φ(x) = xd + 1 be a cyclotomic polynomial where d = d(λ) is a power of 2, and q = q(λ) ≥ 2 be an
integer. Define the ring R over polynomials with integer coefficients R = Z[x]/(Φ(x)). Let χ = χ (λ)
be an error distribution over R. For a secret s ∈ R, let D be a distribution over R2q which samples
a←Rq and e ← χ and returns the pair (a,b = as + e). Let U be the uniform distribution over R2q .
The (decisional) RLWE problem is to distinguish between the two distributions D and U for a fixed
secret s sampled according to a key distributionψ = ψ (λ) over R. The RLWE assumption is that the
RLWE problem is computationally infeasible.
An amortized version of the RLWE problem [7, 71] shows that it is equivalent to sampling s from
a small distributionψ instead of uniformly from the ring Rq . This yields a smaller secret key in an
RLWE-based cryptosystem, e.g. the BGV scheme [22]
DEFINITION 3 (COMMON REFERENCE STRING (CRS)). For some distribution D, the CRS
model starts in a trusted setup with sampling a value such that d ←D. This value is a common
reference string [26, 40] (or a public parameter [50, 78]) that is made available to all participants
before any computation starts.
In the RLWE-based schemes described in this paper, the CRS is a vector of elements uniformly
sampled from Rq which is provided as a public parameter. When computing with multiple keys, it is
a requirement for those keys to be related in a manner to ensure correct computation and decryption.
Hence, schemes are often designed in the CRS model where participants are given access to this
public parameter to generate their individual public keys. More details on this model is discussed in
Sec. 5.
3.2 General homomorphic primitives
Homomorphic encryption (HE) is a class of encryption schemes that support computations such
as addition and multiplication on encrypted data. Existing HE schemes can be divided into three
main types based on the homomorphic operations supported by the evaluation function. In Partial
HE (PHE) schemes, the evaluation function supports either addition (i.e. additive homomorphism),
such as Goldwasser-Micali [59] and Paillier cryptosystem [77], or multiplication (i.e. multiplicative
homomorphism), such as ElGamal cryptosystem [47], but not both. In contrast, Fully HE (FHE)
allows arbitrary number of additions and multiplications. Somewhat HE (SWHE) schemes support
both addition and multiplication on the ciphertexts. Yet, the number of multiplications allowed
is limited due to the inherited construction of the scheme where ciphertexts contain noise that
exponentially scales with multiplications. In general, HE scheme is a tuple of probabilistic polynomial-
time (PPT) algorithms HE = (KeyGen, Enc, Eval,Dec). We define each algorithm as follow.
- HE.KeyGen(1λ) → (pk, sk): Given a security parameter λ determining the security level, the
key generation algorithm outputs a public key pk, a private key sk.
- HE.Enc(pk,m) → c: Given a public key pk and a messagem, the encryption algorithm outputs
a ciphertext c.
- HE.Eval(pk, f , c, c ′) → ceval: Given a public key pk, two ciphertexts c, c ′, and a homomorphic
function f , the evaluation algorithm outputs the evaluated ciphertext ceval = f (c, c ′).
- HE.Dec(sk, c) →m: Given a ciphertext c encrypted under pk and the corresponding secret key
sk, the decryption algorithm outputs the messagem.
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Note, the HE.Eval algorithm homomorphically performs a defined function f on the ciphertexts.
This function is constructed using HE.Add and HE.Mult which are homomorphic addition and
multiplication respectively. In this paper, we will focus on HE schemes that are based on the LWE
problem and its ring variant, RLWE.
3.3 Common techniques in HE
3.3.1 Gadget Toolkits / Key Switching. In many of the RLWE-based HE schemes, the initial
output of homomorphically multiplying two ciphertexts is a longer ciphertext encrypted under a new
secret key element s2. For instance, observe in the BGV scheme [22] presented in Scheme 1, the
product between two ciphertexts c = (c0, c1), c ′ = (c ′0, c ′1) is defined by
c˜mult = (c0 · c ′0, c0 · c ′1 + c ′0 · c1, c1 · c ′1) = (c˜0, c˜1, c˜2) ∈ R3q .
The additional component c2 corresponds to the quadratic element s2 resulted from the multiplica-
tion (c0 + c1 · s)(c ′0 + c ′1 · s) = c˜0 + c˜1 · s + c˜2 · s2. This new ciphertext c˜mult is no longer decryptable by
the secret key s. Therefore, HE schemes employ key switching [22] as a transformation technique to
reduce the dimension after each homomorphic multiplication. This transformation is accomplished
with the aid of auxiliary information provided as evaluation key ek which encrypts s2 under s. The
following gadget toolkit is needed to perform the key switching operation:
- Gadget vector: д = (д0, . . . ,дℓ−1) ∈ Rℓ for some integer ℓ ≥ 1.
- Decomp(x): Given an element x ∈ Rq , decompose it into a short vectoru = (u0, . . . ,uℓ−1) ∈ Rℓ
such that ⟨u,д⟩ = x (mod q).
The decomposition function is often denoted by Decomp(·) = д−1(·) since ⟨д−1(x),д⟩ = x (mod q)
for all x . There have been proposed several gadget toolkits in the literature. A typical example of the
gadget vector is д = (1, 2, . . . , 2 ⌈logq ⌉−1) which corresponds to the bit decomposition BitDecomp :
x =
∑
0≤i< ⌈logq ⌉ 2i · ui 7→ u = (ui )0≤i< ⌈logq ⌉ .
As discussed above, key switching is a commonly used building block of RLWE-based HE
schemes which reduces the dimension of a long ciphertext after homomorphic multiplication. Here
for example, we review how to generate an evaluation key ek and perform the key switching operation
in the BGV scheme on a three-dimensional ciphertext c˜ encrypted under (1, s, s2).
- EvalKeyGen(s): The evaluation key is a special encryption of s2 under s. The evaluation key
ek = (bˆ, aˆ) ∈ Rℓ×2q is generated during the scheme. It is generated by aˆ←Rℓq , eˆ ← χ ℓ , and
bˆ = −s · aˆ + t · eˆ + s2 · д (mod q).
- KeySwitch(ek, c˜): Given an evaluated ciphertext c˜ = (c˜0, c˜1, c˜2) encrypted under the secret
element s2, and the evaluation key ek = (bˆ, aˆ), compute д−1(c˜2) = (u0, . . . ,ud−1). Then, return
the ciphertext (c0, c1) = (c˜0, c˜1) +∑0≤i<ℓ ui · (bˆ[i], aˆ[i]) (mod q).
Other RLWE-based HE schemes, such as BFV (Scheme 2) and CKKS (Scheme 4), perform key
switching similar to the BGV but with a few technical differences which will be described in Sec. 4.
This technique can be generalized and used for other purposes beside dimension reduction. For
example, it can be employed in proxy re-encryption (see Sec. 4.2) to transform a ciphertext from one
encrypting a messagem under one key s1 to one encrypting the same messagem under a different
key s2. It can also be used to facilitate the bootstrapping step [25, 54], which accomplishes fully HE
scheme from a leveled SWHE scheme.
3.3.2 Bootstrapping. Following the blueprint proposed by Gentry [54], one can construct a fully
HE scheme from a somewhat HE scheme. Mainly, when a ciphertext reaches the maximum defined
level where the noise in the ciphertext is large, a bootstrapping technique is applied. The technique
recrypts the ciphertext by homomorphically evaluating the decryption circuit and outputting a fresh
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ciphertext with small noise. This new ciphertext can be further evaluated homomorphically. More
technically, Let c = Enc(pk,m) be a ciphertext at the maximum level encrypted under pk and the
corresponding secret key is sk. To bootstrap, the user sends the evaluator a bootstrapping key, which
is essentially an encryption of the secret key Enc(pk′, sk). Note, the secret key may be encrypted with
the same key pk′ = pk, but this requires using circular security assumption. A bootstrapped ciphertext
can be obtained then by performing cˇ = Bootstrap(Enc(pk′, c), Enc(pk′, sk)) = Enc(pk′,Dec(sk, c)).
Generally, this function has to be of a limited depth to be performed with the somewhat HE
scheme. This mean the degree of the decryption polynomial must be low for the ciphertext to
be bootstrapable [54]. Integer-based schemes, such as Gentry’s scheme [54], require a squashing
technique which additionally makes a sparse subset-sum assumption to decrease the degree of
the decryption polynomial. Recent LWE-based HE schemes, such as the BV scheme [24], uses
relinearization to reduce the ciphertext dimension after each multiplication. As a result, the decryption
polynomial has a low degree and does not need squashing.
3.3.3 Distributed decryption. In many HE protocols based on the multi-party computation (MPC)
protocol, the involved parties may be required to help decrypting the final evaluation result. For
example, in threshold encryption (discussed in Sec. 5.1), the final result is encrypted under the
combination of all the parties’ keys; hence, each party must participate to partially decrypt the
result with their own secret key. This process becomes a distributed decryption protocol since the
decryption now is executed as an MPC protocol. Two algorithms are preformed within this protocol.
First, a partial decryption that is performed by each party who locally decrypts the result with their
own secret key and shares the output. Then, a final decryption is performed by the designated party
who aggregates the shared partial decryptions to obtain the final decrypted result.
Two main security issues has to be addressed for this decryption protocol. First, the shared partially
decrypted ciphertext may leak information on the party’s secret key; hence, additional security
measures, such as noise smudging (or noise flooding), are considered to prevent this leakage. To
make sure that no secret shares can be learned, we need to add larger errors following the Smudging
Lemma [8, 75], which states that adding a large noise “smudges out” the small values in the ciphertext.
Hence, adding a large noise to the decryption component prevents leaking information about the
secret share.
LEMMA 1 (SMUDGING NOISE [8]). Let B1 = B1(λ) and B2 = B2(λ) be two positive integers and
let e0 ∈ [−B1,B1] be a fixed integer. Let e1 ←[−B2,B2] be chosen uniformly at random. Then the
distribution of e1 is statistically indistinguishable from that of e1 + e0 if B1/B2 = ϵ , where ϵ = ϵ(λ) is
a negligible function.
The second security issues is related to the final decryption algorithm, which may leak the
encrypted result. Specifically, an attacker who falsely acquired the shared partial decryptions can
perform the final decryption by combining the shares and retrieve the final result.
3.3.4 Noise reduction techniques. As a result of homomorphic computations, the embedded
noise in ciphertexts increases in magnitude. For a noise magnitude B, each homomorphic addition
doubles the noise as 2B, and each homomorphic multiplication squares it as B2. However, in BFV
scheme (Sec. 4.1.2) multiplication of two ciphertexts obtains ⟨cmult, sk⟩ = qImult + ∆m1m2 + emult
where the noise growth is dominated by emult ≈ t(I1e2 + I2e1) for Ii ≈ ⌈q−1⟨ci , sk⟩⌋. To ensure
correct decryption of the evaluated result, the noise must not exceed the q2 range. We briefly discuss
some of the noise reduction techniques used in HE schemes and refer the readers to [21, 22, 35] for
more details.
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Table 2. Notations specific to single-key approaches.
Category Notation Description
HE-specific
pp HE scheme’s public parameters including security parameter λ and circuit depth L.
∆ A scaling factor used in scale-invariant or rescaling techniques, ∆ = ⌊q/t⌉
ℓ The gadget dimension.
G The gadget matrix constructed asG = In ⊗ д for a gadget vector д.
G−1(·) The bit-decomposition function (inverse gadget), such thatGG−1(a) = a.
PRE-specific rkA→B The re-encryption key switching an encryption from under Alice’s key to Bob’s key.
IBE/ABE-specific
U The universe set of attributes/identities.
ω ′ A subset of attributes ω ′ ⊂ U chosen for encrypting a ciphertext.
ω The set of attributes provided for decrypting a ciphertext.
Modulus switching. Modulus switching is a technique proposed by Brakerski et al. [22] to scale
down the noise after each multiplication. For a L-depth circuit (i.e., requires at most L multipli-
cations), define L + 1 moduli {qL,qL−1, . . . ,q0}. After the i-th multiplication, we can transform a
ciphertext c mod qi into the ciphertext c ′ mod qi−1, where qi−1 < qi , such that the noise scales down
approximately by a factor of qi−1qi . This brings the noise magnitude back to B and changes to a smaller
modulus. This is proven to increase the number of supported homomorphic multiplications before
the need for bootstrapping.
Scale-invariant. A following work of Brakerski [21] proposed the scale-invariant technique which
uses one modulus q to homomorphically evaluate L-depth circuit. This technique completely removes
the need for modulus switching, which requires choosing L + 1 decreasing moduli. In a nutshell, a
message is scaled at encryption by a factor of ∆ = ⌊q/t⌉, where q is significantly larger than t ; hence,
the message is scaled up. After each homomorphic multiplication and at decryption, the ciphertext
is scaled down by a factor of (q/t), resulting in a significant decrease in the noise magnitude. The
origin technique was proposed for LWE-based schemes with t = 2, and was later ported [48] to the
RLWE assumption for efficiency.
These noise reduction techniques are applied in the base HE schemes discussed in Sec. 4 and can
be readily extended to the multi-key (Sec. 5) setting.
4 SINGLE-KEY APPROACHES
Many existing work on homomorphic encryption assume data is always encrypted under one key
in symmetric schemes or one key pair in asymmetric schemes. This key or key pair is typically
owned by a user or an organization. However, in some scenarios such as in the multi-party and
outsourced system models (in Figs. 1b and 1c), data owners may want to reveal the homomorphically
computed result to data consumers who should not be able to decrypt any input data. To accomplish
this, additional step may be performed to transform the encrypted result to an encryption under
a different key through proxy re-encryption (PRE). In other scenarios, we may want to generate
decryption keys for a specific group of authorized users. In this case, we can construct protocols
based on identity-based encryption (IBE) or attribute-based encryption (ABE). In this section, we
review these single-key approaches and discuss their robustness in supporting secure computation.
For simplicity, we list descriptions of the notations used throughout this section in Table 2.
4.1 Homomorphic encryption
Many cloud-based applications can leverage homomorphic encryption to support secure computation
outsourcing without compromising the privacy of user data. In majority of proposed HE protocols for
these applications [76, 90, 101, 103], data used in computation is encrypted under the same key. The
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primary focus in these works is on the construction of efficient homomorphic algorithms to evaluate a
targeted function in the encrypted domain. Applying these protocols in the outsourced system model
(Fig. 1c), where privacy of individual data owners is important, requires making security assumptions
such as semi-honest cloud and non-collusion between the cloud evaluator and participating parties.
These assumptions obviously weaken the security of the protocol, especially in malicious settings
where corruption or collusion compromises data privacy of other data owners. Ideally, users should
keep private data protected under their own keys. However, supporting multi-key HE is complex and
inefficient today. In this survey, we start with reviewing the construction of some well-known base
HE schemes. Then, we review the techniques applied to support homomorphic computations on data
encrypted under multiple keys in later sections.
4.1.1 The Brakerski-Gentry-Vaikuntanathan (BGV) scheme. Brakerski et al. [22], proposed
an efficient leveled HE scheme to allow arbitrary number of additions but limited consecutive
multiplications determined according to the depth of the evaluated circuit.
The BGV scheme is based on the original Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan’s scheme [24], which
is the base of the second generation of HE schemes that improve the efficiency after Gentry’s
breakthrough [54]. The BV scheme was the first scheme basing its security solely on the hardness of
standard LWE assumption, which has proven to be as hard as solving the shortest vector problem
in lattices [70]. With this reduction, the scheme removes the need for making additional strong
assumptions, such as the secret subset sum assumption, and avoids the squashing technique in
bootstrapping. The main construction starts with a SHWE scheme of depth L, which also considers
the depth of its own decryption circuit, then converts to a fully HE scheme through bootstrapping.
The original LWE-based BV scheme encrypts a message bit m ∈ {0, 1} with the secret s ∈ Znq as
c = (b = −⟨a, s⟩ +m + 2e,a) ∈ Zn+1q , where a ∈ Znq is a random vector and e is a small noise.
Essentially, we observe the pattern of masking the message with a large element and some noise to
hold the LWE assumption. To decrypt, we use the secret s and the provided vector a in the ciphertext
to compute b + ⟨a, s⟩ (mod q), which effectively removes the mask and obtainsm+ 2e. The message
is then retrieved by removing the even noise by computingm =m + 2e (mod 2). In subsequent BV
variants, such as the BGV scheme [22], the message can be an integer in Zt , where t is a chosen
plaintext module that is significantly smaller than q. The noise is scaled at-most by t .
The BGV scheme can be instantiated based on LWE or its ring variant RLWE, which operates
on a ring or polynomials and is proven to be more efficient. It also applies optimizations such as
the Smart-Vercauteren [93] batching technique, which packs multiple plaintext messages into one
ciphertext so that computations can be performed in a SIMD manner. For a circuit depth L and public
parameters pp = (λ,d,q, t), we summarize the ring variant of the BGV scheme in Scheme 1.
Additive homomorphisim is straightforward in BV-type schemes, but multiplicative homomor-
phisim is more complicated. Multiplying two ciphertexts c,c ′ results in a higher dimensional
ciphertext that is now encrypted under s2 rather than s. Additionally, the noise within the ciphertext
grows significantly (i.e., e2). Without control, the noise can grow exponentially with respect to the
number of multiplications. Hence, two new techniques were proposed, namely relinearization and
modulus switching, to address these two issues. We briefly explain here how relinearization works and
defer the modulus switching to the next subsection. The core technique used in relinearization is key
switching (described in Sec. 3.3.1), which will transform the encryption from s2 back into s without
decryption. Given the ciphertext product cˆmult = (cˆ0, cˆ1, cˆ2) ∈ R3q , where cˆ0 = c0c ′0, cˆ1 = c0c ′1 + c ′0c1,
and cˆ2 = c1c ′1. The latter contains the productmm
′ encrypted under s2. Hence, we need an evaluation
key ek = (bˆ, aˆ), where aˆ←Rℓq , e ← χ ℓ and bˆ = −aˆ · s + t · e + s2 · д (mod q). The evaluation
key encrypts information about s2 encrypted under s. For stronger security, the secret s2 should
be encrypted under a different secret s ′ to avoid making the circular security assumption, which
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Scheme 1: The Brakerski-Gentry-Vaikuntanathan (BGV) scheme [22]
- BGV.Setup(1λ , 1L): Given the security parameter λ and a multiplicative depth L, choose a
cyclotomic polynomial Φ(x) = xd + 1, where d is a power of 2. Define R = Z[x]/(Φ(x)) as a
polynomial ring of degree d with integer coefficients. Generate the error and key distributions
χ andψ over R, respectively. Choose the ciphertext modulus q and the plaintext modulus t .
Finally, output pp = (d,q, t , χ ,ψ ) as the public parameter. We assume all following algorithms
implicitly take pp as an input.
- BGV.KeyGen(pp): Given the scheme’s public parameters pp, sample a small element s ←ψ
and a small noise e ← χ . Also uniformly sample a←Rq . Set the secret key as sk = s and the
public key as pk = (b,a) ∈ R2q where b = −as + te (mod q).
- BGV.EvalKeyGen(s): Given the secret key s, generate the evaluation key ek by sampling
a˜←Rℓq , e˜ ← χ ℓ and setting b˜ = a˜ · s + e˜ + д · s2 (mod q). Output ek = (b˜, a˜).
- BGV.Enc(pk,m): Given a plaintext message m ∈ Rt , a public key pk = (b,a), uniformly
sample a random r ←ψ and errors e0, e1 ← χ , and encrypt the messagem as c = (c0, c1) ∈ R2q ,
where c0 = rb +m + te0 and c1 = ra + te1.
- BGV.Dec(sk,c): Given a ciphertext c = (c0, c1) ∈ R2q and the secret key sk = s, set s = (1, s) ∈
R2q and decrypt by computingm = (⟨c, s⟩ (mod q)) (mod t) ∈ Rt .
- BGV.Add(c,c ′): Adding two ciphertexts c = (c0, c1), c ′ = (c ′0, c ′1) results in cadd = (c0 +
c ′0, c1 + c
′
1) ∈ R2q .
- BGV.Mult(c,c ′): Given two ciphertexts c,c ′ ∈ R2q , their homomorphic multiplication yields
first an extended ciphertext c˜mult = (c˜0, c˜1, c˜2) that is encrypted under the element s2.
- BGV.Relinearize(ek, c˜mult): Given the evaluation key ek = (b˜, a˜) and a long ciphertext
c˜mult = (c˜0, c˜1, c˜2), perform relinearization as follows:
- Apply gadget decomposition д−1(c2) = (u0, . . . ,uℓ−1) as described in Sec. 3.3.1.
- Output the new relinearized ciphertext as cmult = (c˜0, c˜1) +∑i ui · (b˜[i], a˜[i]) ∈ R2q .
states that the security of the secret key is ensured under the protection of its own public key. The
transformation of the ciphertext is done by computing the new relinearized ciphertext as following:
(1) apply the gadget decomposition algorithm to output the vector д−1(cˆ2); (2) compute the two
dot products u = ⟨д−1(cˆ2), aˆ⟩ and v = ⟨д−1(cˆ2), bˆ⟩; (3) finally, add the results u,v to the first two
elements and output the new ciphertext as cmult = (cˆ0 + v, cˆ1 + u). This is essentially a way of
homomorphically computing the decryption cˆ2 · s2 with secret s2 and embedding it in the ciphertext
result, so it becomes decryptable with s.
4.1.2 The Brakerski/Fan-Vercauteren (BFV) scheme. Similar to the BGV scheme, the BFV
scheme [21, 48] is also designed based on the original BV scheme [24]. Yet, instead of the modulus
switching, it introduces an approach, called scale-invariant, to reduce noise accumulated through ho-
momorphic multiplications. The BFV scheme also adopts the original BV’s key switching technique
for relinearization, which brings back the initial ciphertext product to be an encryption under s as
explained in the previous subsection. We present the RLWE-based BFV scheme in Scheme 2 for a
circuit depth L and a set of public parameters pp = {λ,d,q, t}.
The intuition behind scale-invariance is that elements’ features should not change when scaled
with a common factor. Given two messagesm andm′ scaled by a shared factor ∆. If we aggregate
∆m + ∆m′ and scaled back by 1∆ , then the result is roughly m +m
′, i.e., the relation is preserved
regardless to the scale. Now, let ∆ = ⌊q/t⌉ be the factor used to scale up the message, since q is
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Scheme 2: The Brakerski/Fan-Vercauteren (BFV) scheme [21, 48]
- BFV.Setup(1λ , 1L): Given the security parameter λ and a multiplicative depth L, choose a
cyclotomic polynomial Φ(x) = xd + 1, where d is a power of 2. Define R = Z[x]/(Φ(x)) as a
polynomial ring of degree d with integer coefficients. Generate the error distribution χ over
R. Generate the key distributionψ over R. Choose two integers q and t as the ciphertext and
plaintext moduli, respectively. Finally, output pp = (d,q, t , χ ,ψ ) as the public parameters of
scheme. We assume all following algorithms implicitly take pp as an input.
- BFV.KeyGen(p): Given the public parameters p, sample a secret s ←ψ , an element a←Rq ,
and a small noise e ← χ . Set the secret key as sk = s and the public key as pk = (b,a) ∈ R2q
where b = −as + e (mod q).
- BFV.EvalKeyGen(s): Given the secret s, generate the evaluation key as ek = (b˜, a˜), where
a˜←Rℓq , e˜ ← χ ℓ and b˜ = a˜ · s + e˜ + д · s2 (mod q).
- BFV.Enc(pk,m): Given a public key pk = (b,a) and a message m ∈ Rt , sample a random
r ←ψ and noise elements e0, e1 ← χ . Scaled up the message by a factor ∆ such that ∆m =⌊ q
t
⌋
m. Encrypt the scaled message as c = (c0, c1) ∈ R2q where c0 = rb + e0 + ∆m and
c1 = ra + e1.
- BFV.Dec(sk,c): Given a ciphertext c = (c0, c1) ∈ R2q and the corresponding secret key sk, set
s = (1, s) and decrypt by computing
⌊
t
q ⟨c, s⟩
⌉
∈ Rt .
- BFV.Add(c,c ′): To add two ciphertexts c = (c0, c1) and c ′ = (c ′0, c ′1), compute cadd =
(c0 + c ′0, c1 + c ′1) (mod q).
- BFV.Mult(c,c ′): To multiply two ciphertexts c,c ′ ∈ R2q , compute first the ciphertext c˜mult =
(c˜0, c˜1, c˜2) ∈ R3q by c˜0 =
⌊(t/q) · (c0c ′0)⌉, c˜1 = ⌊(t/q) · (c0c ′1 + c1c ′0)⌉, and c˜2 = ⌊(t/q) · (c1c ′1)⌉.
- BFV.Relinearize(ek, c˜mult): Given the evaluation key ek = (b˜, a˜) and a long ciphertext
c˜mult = (c˜0, c˜1, c˜2), perform relinearization as follows:
- Apply gadget decomposition д−1(c2) = (u0, . . . ,uℓ−1).
- Output the ciphertext cmult = (c˜0, c˜1) +∑i ui · (b˜[i], a˜[i]) ∈ R2q .
significantly larger than t , at encryption then add an initial noise term as described in BFV.Enc. If
we decrypt, we need to scale back by the factor tq to retrieve the messagem. As a result, the noise
is significantly reduced by this scaling down operation. Observe the following proof of decryption
correctness for the decryption
⌊
t
q ⟨c, s⟩
⌉
∈ Rt , where we compute ⟨c, s⟩ as follows.
⟨c, s⟩ = c0 + c1s = (rb + e0 + ∆m) + (ra + e1)s
= r (b + as) + (e0 + e1s) + ∆m = e˜ + ∆m (mod q)
for a small error e˜ = re + e0 + e1s. Then, we re-scale the result by a factor tq as follows to obtain the
messagem. ⌊
t
q
⟨c, s⟩
⌉
=
⌊
t
q
(e˜ + ∆m)
⌉
=m (mod t)
We can use the scaling aspect to effectively reduce the noise after homomorphic evaluations –
namely multiplication, which causes the embedded noise in the ciphertext to grow. In many HE
schemes, the noise growth from multiplication is dominated by e1e2 from the two original ciphertexts
c1 and c2, but in BFV the noise growth is dominated by I1e2 + I2e1 where Ii ≈ ⌈q−1⟨ci , sk⟩⌋.Moreover,
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multiplying two ciphertexts results in squaring the scaling factor, such that we get ∆2(mm′). To
address this issue, the ciphertext must be scaled down by a factor of tq after each multiplication
to reduce the noise and brings the result scale back to ∆(mm′). Note, we could have divided the
ciphertext by the factor of ∆. However, this will incur twice the rounding error. We may not effectively
reduce the large noise in the ciphertext scaled during multiplication; hence, we directly scale by tq
instead. Homomorphic addition does not require a scaling step because the sum of two ciphertexts
directly obtains ∆(m +m′) and does not change the shared factor.
Unlike modulus switching, we observe right away that scale-invariance requires one modulus q
instead of a sequence of decreasing L + 1 moduli qL > qL−1 > . . . ,q0. The modulus switching used
in the BGV scheme performs a gradual scaling after each multiplication to map a ciphertext from Rqi
to Rqi−1 . This causes the ciphertext to be scaled by a factor of
qi
qi−1 . This means the noise magnitude
after each multiplication remains constant, but at the cost of changing to a smaller modulus q.
4.1.3 The Gentry-Sahai-Waters (GSW) scheme. Gentry et al. [55] proposed another LWE-
based HE scheme based on eigenvectors and eigenvalues of a transformation matrix. This new
scheme is simpler and asymptotically faster than other BV variants because it does not require the
complex relinearnization for dimension reduction and modulus switching or scale-invariant for noise
reduction. The intuition can be illustrated as follow. Given a transformation matrix (ciphertext), C,
and an eigenvector (secret key), s, we can retrieve an eigenvalue (message),m, such that sC =ms
(mod q). From this toy construction, homomorphic addition and multiplication of two ciphertextsC
andC ′, encrypted under the same secret s, can be realized easily by computing s(C +C ′) = (m+m′)s
(mod q) and s(C ·C ′) = (mm′) · s (mod q), respectively.
However, this toy construction is insecure as it can be easily broken because finding eigenvectors
for a given transformation matrix is as easy as solving a system of linear equations. To address this
problem, the actual GSW scheme is built on the approximated eigenvectors method, where a small
noise e is added to satisfy the LWE assumption, such that sC =ms + e (mod q). Note, we can view
sC as the decryption of some ciphertextC containing a messagem with a secret key s associated to a
public key A.
Like other LWE-based schemes, the public key in GSW is generated from an LWE instance
over Zq . For a given secret vector s` and a uniformly chosen matrix B, we set the public key as
A = (Bs` + e,B) and the secret key as s = (1,−s`). When the secret key s is provided at decryption,
we have sA ≈ 0 because sA = (1,−s`)(Bs` + e,B) = Bs` + e − Bs` = e ≈ 0. This operation removes the
masking matrix B in the ciphertext. To encrypt a message m under the public key A, we sample a
random matrix R, to ensure semantic security of the scheme, and compute C = AR +m such that
the decryption sC = s(AR +m) = sAR +ms = ms + eR, where eR is small when R has entries in
Z2. If s is an integer vector and m is restricted to the message space {0, 1}, we can determine the
original message from (ms + e) with high probability. Specifically, ifm = 0, then sC is close to 0; or
an integer vector otherwise.
Homomorphic evaluations are performed as natural matrix operations. The product of multiplying
two GSW ciphertexts does not contain a long secret s2. Therefore, it does not require the complex
relinearization operation used in the previous BV variant schemes. Yet, homomorphic multiplication
still increases the noise. The product of multiplying two GSW ciphertextsC andC ′ is
sCmult = sCG
−1(C ′) = (ms + e)C ′
=m(m′s + e ′) +C ′e
=mm′s + (me ′ +C ′e)
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Scheme 3: A variant of the Gentry-Sahai-Waters (GSW) scheme [6]
- GSW.Setup(1λ , 1L): Given a security parameter λ and a circuit depth L, choose a lattice
dimension n, an error distribution χ , and a modulus q such that the LWE problem holds. Set
ℓ = ⌈logq⌉. Output the scheme public parameters as pp = (q,n, χ ).
- GSW.KeyGen(pp): Sample a secret vector s` ←Zn−1q and the noise vector e ← χnℓ . Choose
a random matrix B←Zn−1×nℓq and set b = s`B + e ∈ Znℓq . Output the secret key sk as
s = (1,−s`) ∈ Znq and the public key pk as A = (b,B) ∈ Zn×nℓq , observe that sA ≈ 0 with
respect to some small noise.
- GSW.Enc(pk,m): Letm←{0, 1} be a message bit and pk be a given public key. To encrypt the
message, choose a random matrix R←{0, 1}nℓ×nℓ compute the ciphertext asC = AR +mG ∈
Zn×nℓq , such that the property sC ≈msG holds.
- GSW.Dec(sk,C): To decrypt a given ciphertext C with the associated secret key sk, define
a vector w = (0, . . . , 0, ⌈q/2⌉) ∈ Znq . Then compute x = sCG−1(wT ) ∈ Znℓq . Output the
decrypted message as m˜ =
⌊ xq/2 ⌉.
- GSW.Add(C,C ′): To add two ciphertextsC = (AR +mG),C ′ = (AR′ +m′G), directly output
Cadd = C +C
′ = A(R + R′) + (m +m′)G ∈ Zn×nℓq , such that sCadd ≈ (m +m′)sG.
- GSW.Mult(C,C ′): To multiply two ciphertexts C,C ′, utilize the gadget matrix and output
Cmult = C · C ′ = CG−1(C ′) ∈ Zn×nℓq .The product matrix satisfies sCmult ≈ sCG−1(C ′) ≈
msGC ′ ≈ (m ·m′)sG.
The new error term is (me ′ + eC ′). Multiplication works if this term is small. While e and e ′
are small noise, we need to makem andC ′ small. The former can be achieved by restricting input
message,m ∈ {0, 1}, butC ′ (mod q) is large making eC ′ a large noise. Without optimizations, the
noise growth for multiplying two ciphertexts is exponential. This shows a significant noise increase
compared to homomorphic addition that is bounded by 2B. To achieve a better noise management,
the scheme applies a flattening technique to transformC ′ with integer coefficient module q into bits
through BitDecomp and PowersOf2, as discussed in Section 3.3. Hence, the noise growth becomes
linear and bounded by (nℓ + 1)B as a result of multiplying the noise term with small values in Z2.
A variant of GSW [6] later suggested the use of special gadget matrix for a simpler design with
a tighter bound on the noise growth. The gadget matrix G is a diagonal matrix containing powers
of two д = (1, 2, 4, . . . , 2ℓ−1), where ℓ = ⌈logq⌉ and associated with a function G−1(·) such that
GG−1(a) = a for any given a ∈ Zq . It also proposed a bootstrapping technique for GSW to support
arbitrary homomorphic evaluations. We describe the main functions of this GSW variant in Scheme 3.
Due to the construction of the GSW, there is another way to decrypt and retrieve the message
bit m ∈ {0, 1}. More specifically, if we view a GSW ciphertext C = AR +mG as two aggregated
parts, a randomized public key AR and a messagem masked by a gadget matrix G represented in the
powers-of-2 form. Then the i-th column ci of this ciphertext contains the encryption ofm2i and can
be decrypted by computing ⟨ci , s⟩ (mod 2). The collection of entries are required for homomorphic
evaluations, but decryption can be done using a single column. The penultimate (i.e., second-to-last)
column corresponds to encryption ofm · 2ℓ−2, which decrypts to plaintext in the interval (q/4,q/2]
appropriate for decoding the message bit. Hence, extracting the penultimate column is sufficient
to use for decryption. To illustrate, we provide a proof of correctness for the GSW decryption as
follows. Letw = (0, 0, . . . , ⌈q/2⌉) be the penultimate column of the gadget matrixG corresponding
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to the power 2ℓ−2 and compute x as following.
x = sCG−1(wT ) = s(AR +mG)G−1(wT )
=msGG−1(wT )
=ms(wT )
This process extracts the penultimate column of the GSW ciphertexts, which is sufficient to for
decryption. Compute m =
⌊ xq/2 ⌉ and retrieve the message m˜ ∈ {0, 1} after checking whether it is
closer to 0 or q/2. Using a single column from the ciphertext to decrypt certainly has its benefits.
One of them is reducing the size of the ciphertext results transmitted over the network, especially in
cases we discuss later in Sec. 5.2, where ciphertexts are extended to multiple keys and may suffer
exponential increase in their size. More importantly, this property provides a mechanism to decrypt a
ciphertext without fully revealing information about the embedded secret key. We review in later
sections how this property is exploited to build a secure proxy re-encryption that is based on the
GSW scheme.
4.1.4 The Cheon-Kim-Kim-Song (CKKS) scheme. Previous HE schemes support linear trans-
formations of encrypted integers or bits through homomorphic addition and multiplication. However,
many machine learning algorithms, such as logistic regression and neural networks, often operate
on real numbers (e.g., 12.345). In integer-based HE schemes, a common way to deal with these real
numbers is to scale them up by a relatively large factor (e.g., 106) prior to encryption so that we only
need to work with integers (e.g., 12.345 × 106). The scaling dramatically increases the input values
and subsequently requires a much larger plaintext modulus and even larger ciphertext modulus. As a
result, the computation time will be significantly impacted.
Cheon et al. [35] proposed a HE scheme that supports fixed-point arithmetic over encrypted real
numbers. The scheme bases its security on the RLWE problem and is based on a construction that
is similar to the rest of BV-type schemes discussed in Sections 4.1.1 and 4.1.2. The main intuition
is treating the noise embedded at encryption, to realize the LWE assumption, as the rounding error
in fixed-point arithmetic since real numbers inherently carry error through rounding. We give an
overview of the RLWE-based CKKS scheme in Scheme 4.
What is unique in the CKKS scheme is the proposal of new message encoding and decoding
methods and a rescaling operation that reduces the accumulating noise in a similar way as rounding
in plaintext fixed-point arithmetic. Before encryption, the encoding method applies a canonical
embedding to map a vector of complex or real numbers into a polynomial in R. Let d being the degree
of the cyclotomic polynomial Φ(x) = xd+1 and determines the number of slots for ciphertext packing,
the encoding procedure allows d/2 messages (z1, z2, . . . , zd/2) to be packed into a polynomialm′ ∈ R
so that efficient evaluation can be carried out in SIMD manner. If the number of messages in the
vector is less than d/2, the remaining slots are set to zero. The other half of slots inm′ will be filled
with conjugates of the corresponding message zi during the canonical embedding. The polynomial
m′ is then scaled by a large factor ∆, say ∆ = 240, to place the significand far away from the LSBs
(least significant bits). Note, placing significand far away from the LSBs is to accommodate the
noise growth and to preserve precision during the rescaling operation, as illustrated in Fig. 4. The
output of the encoding method is a plaintext m ∈ R containing the packed messages scaled by a
factor ∆. At encryption, the plaintext m is masked with a randomized public key. A small noise e
is added to ensure the security, such that c = r (b,a) + (e0,+m, e1). If we decrypt the ciphertext, we
obtain the message Dec(sk,c) =m + e, where e is a small noise which can be considered as small
rounding error inherited from fixed-point arithmetic. The decrypted plaintext is then decoded from a
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Scheme 4: The Cheon-Kim-Kim-Song (CKKS) scheme [35]
- CKKS.Setup(1λ , 1L): Given the security parameter λ and a multiplicative depth L, choose a
cyclotomic polynomial Φ(x) = xd + 1, where d is a power of 2. Define R = Z[x]/(Φ(x)) as a
polynomial ring of degree d with integer coefficients. Generate the error distribution χ over
R. Generate the key distribution ψ over R. Choose an integer q as the ciphertext modulus.
Finally, output pp = (d,q, χ ,ψ ) as the public parameters of scheme. We assume all following
algorithms implicitly take pp as an input.
- CKKS.KeyGen(pp): Given the public parameters p, sample a small element s ← χ and a
small noise e ←ψ .Uniformly sample a←Rq . Output the secret key as sk = s and the public
key as pk = (b,a) ∈ R2q where b = −as + e (mod q). Sample a˜←Rℓq , e˜ ← χ ℓ and set
b˜ = a˜ · s + e˜ + д · s2 (mod q). Output ek = (b˜, a˜) as the evaluation key.
- CKKS.Encode(z,∆): Given a vector of complex numbers z = (z1, . . . , zd/2), the encoding
algorithm applies canonical embedding mapping into the polynomial message such that
m(X ) = σ−1(⌊∆ · π−1(z)⌉), using the canonical embedding map σ and the natural projection
π : H→ Cd/2 and H = {(zj )j ∈Z∗M : z−j = zj ,∀j ∈ Z∗M }.
- CKKS.Decode(m,∆): Given an encoded polynomial messagem(X ) ∈ R, apply the decoding
algorithm to transformm into a complex vector z such that z = π ◦ σ (∆−1 ·m).
- CKKS.Enc(pk,m): Given a public key pk and a plaintext message m, uniformly sample a
random r ←ψ and noise elements e0, e1 ∈ χ . Encrypt the message m as c = (c0, c1) ∈ R2q
where c0 = rb + e0 +m and c1 = ra + e1.
- CKKS.Dec(sk,c): Given a ciphertext c = (c0, c1) ∈ R2q and the secret key sk = s, set s = (1, s)
and decrypt by computingm = ⟨c, s⟩ (mod q).
- CKKS.Add(c,c ′): For two ciphertexts c = (c0, c1) and c ′ = (c ′0, c ′1), output cadd = (c0+c ′0, c1+
c ′1) ∈ R2q .
- CKKS.Mult(c,c ′): For two ciphertexts c,c ′ ∈ R2q , their initial homomorphic multiplication
yields a long ciphertext c˜mult = (c˜0, c˜1, c˜2) ∈ R3q encrypted under the secret (1, s, s2).
- CKKS.Relinearize(ek, c˜mult): Given the evaluation key ek = (b˜, a˜) and a long ci-
phertext c˜mult = (c˜0, c˜1, c˜2), apply key switching and output cmult = (c0, c1) +
(⟨д−1(c2), b˜⟩, ⟨д−1(c2), a˜⟩) ∈ R2q .
- CKKS.Rescale(c): For an evaluated ciphertext c = (c0, c1) ∈ R2q , compute c ′i =
⌊
∆−1 · ci
⌉
for
i ∈ {0, 1} and a scaling factor ∆ and return the re-scaled ciphertext c ′ = (c ′0, c ′1) ∈ R2q′ where
q′ = ∆−1 · q.
polynomial in R to a real or complex message vector (z1, z2, . . . , zd/2) using a reverse procedure of
the encoding.
Homomorphic multiplication causes the scaling factor to square and increases embedded noise.
In order to maintain the same precision and prevents the noise from blowing up, the result must be
“rounded” homomorphically. To do so, the scheme rescales the ciphertext after each multiplication.
This method can be viewed as similar to the rounding performed on the plaintexts in approximate
computations. In particular, the ciphertext c can is multiplied by the scaling factor, such that ∆−1c,
which discards log∆ least significant bits as illustrated in Fig. 4. As a result, we obtain a ciphertext
encrypting the message mmult∆ with a reduced noise ∆
−1 · emult, and the modulus is switched to
q′ = ∆−1 · q corresponding to the new scaled ciphertext. CKKS uses a technique similar to modulus
switching to perform rescaling. For a circuit depth L, choose a large modulus q0 and define a
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Fig. 4. Illustration of ciphertext re-scaling in CKKS
decreasing chain of moduli qL,qL−1, . . . ,q0, such that the modulus for a level l ∈ L is defined as
ql = q0 · ∆l . A ciphertext c (mod ql ) is rescaled as
⌊
∆−1 · c⌉ (mod ql−1). The modulus switching
technique used here is for a different purpose compared to its use in the BGV. While it preserves
the underlying plaintext and manages the noise growth in BGV, it is used in CKKS to remove the
LSBs of the ciphertext to maintain the precision. Because of this recurring discard of the LSBs,
we need to choose appropriate parameters for the modulus q0 and the scaling factor ∆ according
to the circuit depth L to prevent precision loss. Specifically, we ensure that (logqL ≥ L · log∆) to
construct a leveled HE scheme sufficient to evaluate an L-depth circuit. After reaching the level q0,
bootstrapping [28, 33] may be applied to output a refreshed ciphertext at a higher level that supports
further homomorphic operations.
A subsequent construction of the CKKS [34] proposed a variant based on the Residue Number
System (RNS) to optimize the performance. Most HE scheme implementations requires that the
modulus q is at least 128 bits (often significantly larger), which may not fit in the native 64-bit modern
hardware. As an optimization, they apply Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) and similar techniques
to represent the modulus as a set of moduli less than 64-bit. The RNS-variant decomposes the large
modulus q into a sequence of smaller distinct prime moduli q′0,q
′
1, . . . ,q
′
L , such that q =
∏L
i=0 q
′
i .
By choosing a chain of moduli that are pairwise coprimes, we can no longer perform the original
rescaling technique since the moduli do not correspond to the scaling factor ∆. To address this issue,
the RNS-variant proposes an approximate rescaling technique, which chooses the primes such that
their ratio is as close as the scaling factor. For example, the prime moduli q′l is chosen such that
q′l ≈ ∆ so that
ql
ql−1 = q
′
l ≈ ∆. After homomorphic multiplication, the ciphertext product with a
squared scale ∆2 is rescaled by the factor qlql−1 to a ciphertext encrypting ofm1m2 with an approximate
scale ∆. The new ciphertext contains an additional small approximation error, but the most significant
bits of the plaintext remain extractable.
4.1.5 Discussion. From reviewing these base HE schemes, we observe similarities in their design
pattern and methods to decrease in ciphertext dimension and to deal with noise. We share these
similarities and discuss some initial ideas to support homomorphic computation on ciphertexts
encrypted under multiple keys.
In term of similarity, the most recent HE schemes are constructed based on the LWE problem, or
its ring variant, RLWE. The first unique characteristic is in the way that some small noise is added
when masking a secret. Another characteristic is that the public key or the ciphertext contains a
counter-part that can cancel the large masking element sampled from some mathematical space.
These two characteristics are clearly visible in the KeyGen and Enc algorithms of the presented HE
schemes. Homomorphic multiplication is highly inefficient because it often raises the ciphertext
dimension from an encryption of s to s2 (except GSW due to its construction) and dramatically
increases the embedded noise. Hence, focuses are on designing techniques to reduce the ciphertext
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dimension and noise. Among these techniques, key switching used in dimension reduction is useful
to support MKHE. Whereas common noise reduction techniques, such as modulus switching in
BGV, scale invariant in BFV, rescaling in CKKS, follow a typical pattern of factorizing the noise
by a scaling factor after each multiplication. Often, these reduction techniques have impact on the
embedded messages, hence plaintext messages are typically scaled up before encryption.
There are two common tricks we can apply to extend the base HE schemes to support homomorphic
computation on ciphertexts encrypted using multiple keys.
The first trick is to follow a concept called layered encryption [69]. Let c be a ciphertext encrypting
a messagem under Alice’s key pkA. We can add second layer of encryption under Bob’s key pkB ,
such that c˜ = Enc(pkB , Enc(pkA,m)). In theory, the ciphertext can be further extended indefinitely.
Obviously, the problem is at decryption. Bob requires Alice, and other involved parties if any, to
remove the corresponding layer of encryption. Homomorphic evaluations can be applied, but all
ciphertexts must be encrypted in the same order. The number of evaluation is very restricted due to
exponential increase of ciphertext size and noise magnitude as we further discuss in Sec. 5.
On the other hand, one may leverage key switching to change the encryption of a message from one
key pk to another pk′. This method follows the notion of proxy re-encryption technique we discuss in
the following section. Recall that a special evaluation key ekpk→pk′ which embeds information about
both keys, we can perform KeySwitch(ekpk→pk′, Enc(pk,m)) = Enc(pk′,m) to achieve this purpose.
The major issue in this method is to ensure the security of the secret key sk because the generation of
the evaluation key requires encrypting sk under the new key pk′. If the secret key sk′ is owned by
another party, then he or she can obtain sk violating the privacy requirement of data encrypted under
pk.
These simple tricks are neither secure nor efficient in practice. Hence, we review additional
techniques which offer more than just simple extension of the base HE schemes.
4.2 Proxy Re-encryption
Changing a ciphertext from the encryption of one key to another without exposing the plaintext is a
useful feature in many applications. Especially, in cloud computing applications where a user Alice
stores her encrypted data in the cloud as illustrated in Fig. 1c and another user Bob wants to perform
some evaluations and retrieve the result from the cloud. It is reasonable to assume that Alice does not
want to share her private key.
Without Alice’s private key, Bob will not be able to decrypt the result. To address this problem,
we can design the system using an interactive model. The cloud can blind the homomorphically
evaluated ciphertext with a randomness and sends it to Alice, who decrypts it with skA and sends back
another ciphertext re-encrypted under pkB . Upon receiving the new ciphertext, the cloud evaluator
homomorphically removes the blinding element and continues remaining evaluations or forwards
the result to Bob, who can decrypt with skB . Although this method is also applicable for changing
the encryption under different schemes as needed, e.g., to convert from a SWHE scheme to a PHE
scheme for efficiency [20], it is cumbersome due to the interactiveness.
However, changing the encryption under different keys within the same scheme can be done
non-interactively. This gives the advantage of fully outsourcing computations to the cloud, i.e., Alice
does not need to participate in evaluations.
Proxy re-encryption (PRE) is the process of converting a ciphertext from an encryption under a
public key pk to one under another pk′ without decryption. A third party (the proxy) is delegated to
perform this re-encryption without disclosing the underlying message or the secret key sk. Consider
the previous cloud application addressed by the PRE scheme as shown in Fig. 5. With a PRE
scheme, Alice (the delegator) provides to the proxy cloud a special re-encryption key rkA→B used to
re-encrypt the ciphertext, so it becomes decryptable by Bob (the delegatee). The key is generated
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Fig. 5. Illustration of proxy re-encryption.
based on her secret key and Bob’s public key, such as rkA→B = ReKeyGen(skA, pkB ). Variations
of proposed PRE schemes can be unidirectional rkA→B [67, 91], where Alice’s ciphertext can be
only converted into Bob’s, but not the other way around, or bidirectional rkA↔B [12, 27], where the
ciphertext can be converted from Alice’s to Bob’s, or vice versa. We focus on the former in this
review.
The formal construction of PRE consists of five PPT algorithms, PRE = (KeyGen, ReKeyGen,
Enc, ReEncrypt, Dec). Existing HE schemes can be extended to PRE by adding the two PRE-specific
algorithms (ReKeyGen,ReEncrypt). We briefly describe these algorithms with the PRE variant of
ElGamal scheme in Scheme 5 as an example. The generation of the re-encryption key in ReKeyGen
is scheme-dependent, i.e., it depends on the mathematical construction of the base scheme. For
example, the key rk in ElGamal scheme is generated as rkA→B = дsB/sA from Bob’s public key
pkB = д
sB and Alice’s secret key skA = sA. The re-encryption process leverages basic rules for
exponentiation to remove sA from the encryption. Regarding security, recall that ElGamal bases its
security on the discrete logarithm problem1. This mean it is difficult for the proxy, or Bob, to learn
the secret key sA from the re-encryption key.
Scheme 5: A PRE-variant of ElGamal scheme [12]
- ElGamalPRE.KeyGen(G,p,д): Let G be a cyclic group of order p and a generator д. Sample
two random values sA, sB ←Zp and compute hA = дsA ,hB = дsB . Set the key pairs {pkA =
(G,p,д,hA), skA = sA} for Alice, and {pkB = (G,p,д,hB ), skB = sB } for Bob.
- ElGamalPRE.ReKeyGen(skA, pkB ): To allow Bob to transform a ciphertext under Alice’s
public key to one under his, Alice generates a re-encryption key rkA→B . Given Alice’s own
secret key skA and Bob’s public key pkB , compute rkA→B = pk
1/skA
B = (дsB )1/sA = дsB/sA
- ElGamalPRE.Enc(pkA,m): To encrypt a given a messagem under Alice’s public key, choose
a random value r ∈ {1, . . . ,p − 1} and compute the ciphertext c = (c1, c2) = (дr ,mhrA).
- ElGamalPRE.ReEncrypt(rkA→B ,c): Given a ciphertext c = (c1, c2) and a re-encryption key
rkA→B , a proxy can re-encrypt the ciphertext as c2 ·rkA→B = (mдr sA ·дsB/sA ) =mдr (sAsB/sA) =
mдr sB to obtain Cˆ = (c1, c ′2) under Bob’s public key.
- ElGamalPRE.Dec(skB , Cˆ): Given a re-encrypted ciphertext Cˆ = (c1, c ′2) and a corresponding
secret key skB , Bob decrypts by performing c ′2/csB1 = (mдr sB )/(дr )sB =m.
In LWE-based HE schemes, performing key switching obtains a re-encrypted message under a
different key without revealing it. The process requires an evaluation key, which is conceptually
the same as re-encryption key in PRE. In this context, we will refer to the evaluation key as the
1For a carefully chosen cyclic group G = Z×p with a prime modulus p and a generator д, the problem states that given an
element h = дx ∈ G, finding the discrete logarithm x is difficult.
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re-encryption key. As discussed in Sec. 4.1, the technique is often utilized for relinearization to
convert initial results of homomorphic multiplication from one under s2 back to one under s. The
re-encryption key is generated as a special encryption of s2 under s. For example in the BGV
scheme, the re-encryption key is generated by the party who has access to both keys sk = s2 and
pk′ = (a′s ′ + te ′,−a′). To avoid making circular security assumption, BGV chooses pk′ to be new
public key containing a different secret from s for each evaluation level. The security of the secret s2
is ensured by the LWE problem.
In theory, any HE scheme can be extended to PRE by following the key switching technique.
The PALISADE software library [2] implements the PRE primitive for its HE schemes, including
BGV, BFV, and CKKS, where the re-encryption key is generated based on two provided secret keys.
However in practice, due to the scheme construction based on the LWE problem, the secret key
is retrievable if one can decrypt the re-encryption key. Specifically, Alice generates rkA→B as an
encryption of her secret key skA under Bob’s public key pkB . This design is insecure since Bob
may collude with the proxy and obtain skA after decrypting rkA→B with his secret key skB . The
re-encrypted message under pkB may also leak information about skA when decrypted. Therefore,
additional measures must be taken when extending LWE-based schemes to PRE to prevent leaking
the delegator’s secret key.
Recently, Yasuda et al. [104] extended a GSW variant [55, 80] to PRE using key switching. We
describe this PRE variant of GSW in Scheme 6. Alice generates rkA→B as a GSW encryption of skA
under Bob’s public key pkB and sends it to the proxy. Note, decrypting the re-encryption key with
Bob’s secret key skB = sB yields Alice’s secret key according to this proof.
sBrkA→B = sB (ABX +
(
sAG
0(n−1)×nℓ)
)
= sBABX + (1,−s`B )
(
sAG
0(n−1)×nℓ)
)
≈ sAG
Given a ciphertextC under Alice’s public key, the proxy cloud re-encrypts it as Cˆ = rkA→B ·G−1(C).
However, if Bob receives and decrypts Cˆ, he will be able to learn information about Alice’s secret
key from the plaintext sBCˆ ≈msAG. Instead, the PRE scheme leverages the special GSW property
where a ciphertext can be decrypted using only its penultimate column, which corresponds the
power-of-two 2ℓ−2. The last element of this column contains partial elements of the re-encrypted
ciphertext, Cˆ = rkA→B ·G−1(C), which contains in its last element the message m2ℓ−2. The proxy
sends the penultimate column cˆ of the re-encrypted ciphertext to Bob. With releasing this column
only, we not only reduce the size of the ciphertext, but also withhold possible information about
sA to prevent its leakage. This design renders a single-hop PRE scheme, which means cˆ cannot
be re-encrypted or homomorphically evaluated after its re-encryption because it loses the GSW
ciphertext structure. Still, it is useful to use the PRE primitive with other extended GSW schemes,
such as the multi-key variant [80] (discussed later in Sec. 5.2) where the final result is re-encrypted
under the receiver’s key to avoid distributed decryption.
Proxy re-encryption is a powerful method to support secure outsourced evaluations. Ciphertexts
encrypted under different keys can be individually re-encrypted under a receiver’s (delegatee’s) key
so they can be homomorphically evaluated under the same key. Other applications, such as secure
file sharing, may use this technique for basic access control to make ciphertexts decryptable with
authorized user’s secret keys, but it requires providing re-encryption keys to do so. We discuss an
alternative approach to support this access control functionality without re-encryption keys in the
following section.
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Scheme 6: A PRE-variant of GSW scheme [104]
- GSWPRE.Setup(1λ , 1L): Given a security parameter λ and a circuit depth L, choose a lattice
dimension n, an error distribution χ , and a modulus q such that the LWE problem holds. Set
ℓ = ⌈logq⌉ and choose a random matrix B←Zn−1×nℓq . Output the scheme public parameters
as pp = (q,n, χ ,B).
- GSWPRE.KeyGen(pp): Given a security parameter λ, circuit depth L, and a GSW public
parameters pp, sample a secret vector s` ←Zn−1q and the noise vector e ← χnℓ . Setb = s`B+e ∈
Znℓq . Output the secret key sk as s = (1,−s`) ∈ Znq and the public key pk asA = (b,B) ∈ Zn×nℓq ,
observe that sA ≈ 0 with respect to some small noise.
- GSWPRE.ReKeyGen(skA, pkB ): Given Alice’s own secret key skA = sA and Bob’s public
key pkB = AB , Alice generates a re-encryption key rkA→B as rkA→B = ABX +
(
sAG
0(n−1)×nℓ
)
,
where X is a random binary matrix. Observe that the property sB · rkA→B ≈ sAG holds.
- GSWPRE.Enc(pkA,m): To encrypt a given a messagem under Alice’s public key pkA, choose
a random matrix R←{0, 1}nℓ×nℓ and compute the ciphertext as C = AAR +mG ∈ Zn×nℓq ,
such that the propriety sAC ≈msAG holds.
- GSWPRE.ReEncrypt(rkA→B ,C): Given a ciphertextC and a re-encryption key rkA→B , a proxy
can re-encrypt the ciphertext by computing Cˆ = rkA→B · G−1(C). Output the re-encrypted
ciphertext as the penultimate column cˆ in Cˆ.
- GSWPRE.Dec(skB , Cˆ): Given a re-encrypted ciphertext cˆ and the corresponding secret key
skB , Bob decrypts as ⟨cˆ, sB⟩(mod 2).
4.3 Identity-/Attribute-based Encryption
Identity-based encryption (IBE) [15, 89], and its generalization attribute-based encryption (ABE) [85],
is a type of encryption scheme that provides a fine-grained access control to the encrypted message
based on users’ identities or attributes.
Compared to the PRE scheme, IBE/ABE schemes do not require data owners to provide re-
encryption keys for changing the ciphertexts encrypted under their public key to ones encrypted
under the intended user’s key. A data owner can encrypt their data under a derived public key based
on predefined identities or attributes for authorized users. In IBE schemes, the data owner encrypts
the data under a key derived from a user’s identity ID, e.g., their email address. The ciphertext can
be only decrypted with an authorized secret key skID issued corresponding to the user’s identity ID.
ABE schemes encrypt data according to a set of attributes predefined by the data owner and often
described as an access policy structure, such that the ciphertext can only be decrypted by a user
whose attributes satisfy this policy. The IBE scheme can viewed as a special type of ABE scheme
where the sole defined attribute is the identity of the user. Henceforth, we focus our descriptions on
the ABE scheme.
An ABE scheme has four core cryptographic functions, ABE = (Setup,KeyGen, Enc,Dec). A
trusted central authority, acting as an attribute authority, generates a master key pair (mpk,msk) in
the Setup function and uses the master secret key msk to derive decryption keys in the KeyGen for
authorized users after checking their attributes. Data owners and users interact with this attribute
authority to obtain authorized key based on the attributes to perform encryption and decryption.
Fig. 6 shows an example ABE scheme where a data owner encrypts their data and defines the access
policy stating that “the ciphertext can be only decrypted by a user who is both a teacher and in the
computer science department”. In general, there are two types of ABE schemes based on where
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Fig. 6. Illustration of CP-ABE framework where the access policy is embedded in the ciphertext
the access structure is defined, Key-policy (KP-ABE) [61] and Ciphertext-policy (CP-ABE) [11].
In CP-ABE, the ciphertext is encrypted based on the access policy, and the secret key is generated
based on the attributes as illustrated in Fig. 6. In KP-ABE, the ciphertext is encrypted based on a set
of attributes, and the user’s secret key is generated based on a defined access policy.
The first construction of ABE was proposed by Sahai and Waters [85] as a fuzzy form of identity-
based encryption (IBE), in which data are encrypted under a key derived from user’s identity [15, 89].
The fuzzy IBE scheme (FIBE) realizes access control through combined techniques of Shamir’s linear
secret sharing [88] and Lagrange polynomial interpolation. The construction is based on Bilinear
maps, where G1 and G2 are two groups of prime order p. The group G1 has a generator д and a
defined bilinear map e : G1 ×G1 → G2, such that for all a,b ∈ Zp , we have e(дa ,дb ) = e(д,д)ab . The
security of the scheme is based on the Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption (DBDH) [13],
which states that given a group generator д and uniformly chosen values a,b, c ∈ Zp , then no
polynomial-time adversary is able to distinguish the tuple (дa ,дb , e(д,д)ab ) and (дa ,дb , e(д,д)c ) with
non-negligible advantage. We briefly describe each function in the FIBE scheme in Scheme 7.
This scheme enables a generalized controlled access to encrypted data when there are at least d
overlapping attributes in the ciphertext and the secret key. Although the attributes are public, the
access control is still cryptographically enforced by the underlaying security assumption. Note that
each attribute in U has a corresponding unique secret value ti in the master secret key. The attribute
authority issues a secret key for a user depending on their provided attributes, such that it computes
the value Diд
q(i )
ti for the i-th attribute based on the master secret key. Hence without direct access
to msk, it is not possible for an external adversary to forge a new secret key with desired attributes
without knowing the corresponding secret values ti . The secret values cannot be retrieved from the
public parameters дti due to the fundamental hardness of the discrete log, which the DBDH builds
upon. Moreover, an existing unauthorized user cannot modify their secret key to selectively add
attributes to their set ω to satisfy |ω ∩ ω ′ | ≥ d , and decrypt a ciphertext.
Traditional ABE schemes provide access control to encrypted messages. Homomorphic ABE
(ABHE) schemes can further support evaluations on these ciphertexts, which adds a fifth function,
Eval to the ABE functions. Gentry et al. [55] proposed a leveled homomorphic ABE based on LWE.
The scheme is based on an earlier work by Gorbunov et al. [60] which uses a variation of garbled
circuits as the access policy structure, but it is the first ABE scheme that also supports computation on
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Scheme 7: The Fuzzy Identity-based Encryption (FIBE) scheme [85]
- FIBE.Setup(λ): This function is performed by a trusted third party (TTP), acting as the
Attribute Authority, and takes as an input the security parameter λ which determines the size
of inputs. It defines a universe of attributes U, randomly chooses a unique value ti where
i = 1, .., |U| to corresponds to each defined attribute, and chooses a secret value y. The
outputs of this function are the public key mpk = {{Ti = дti }i ∈1, ..., |U |,Y = e(д,д)y } and the
master key msk = {t1, . . . , t |U |,y}. Both the universe of attributes U and the public key mpk
are published, but the master key msk is kept secret with the trusted Attribute Authority.
- FIBE.Enc(pk,ω ′,m): This function takes as input a message m, a set of attributes ω ′ ⊂ U,
and the public key mpk. It chooses a random r ∈ Zp for semantic security and outputs the
ciphertext c = (ω ′,mY r , {T ri }i ∈1, ..., |ω′ |).
- FIBE.KeyGen(msk,ω): This function is performed by the TTP and generates a secret key
sk associated with a given set of user’s attributes ω. Specifically for each user, it defines an
independent polynomial q(x) of degree d − 1 and q(0) = y, where y is a secret defined in msk.
The function outputs sk = {Di = д
q(i )
ti ; i = 1, .., |ω |}.
- FIBE.Dec(sk,ω,c): This function takes as input a secret key sk and a ciphertext c to decrypt
based on Lagrange interpolation and secret sharing techniques. The decryption is successful
if and only if |ω ∩ ω ′ | ≥ d, i.e., the user has at least d attributes in ω matching the attributes
ω ′ embedded in the ciphertext. Let a set s = ω ∩ ω ′; |s | = d be arbitrary elements which
can reconstruct the secret element y, and ∆i,s [0] are defined Lagrange coefficients, then the
ciphertext is decrypted as:
m =mY r /
∏
i=1, ..., |s |
(e(д
q(i )
ti ,дr ti ))∆i,s [0]
=me(д,д)ry/
∏
i=1, ..., |s |
(e(д,д)rq(i))∆i,s [0]
=me(д,д)ry/e(д,д)ry =m
the encrypted data. Mainly, let ℓ be the number of defined attributes, and C be a garbled circuit with ℓ
input wires and one output wire, each input wire corresponds to the encoded input of two independent
public/secret key pair. The scheme uses an encoding mechanism [60] with a random seed to encode
each input wire and use the encoded output of the circuit as a masking value when encrypting the
message. Each authorized user receives a secret key which embeds a set of recoding keys associated
with their attributes and corresponding to those used in the encryption. These recoding keys are
similar to a translation table for a garbled circuit, such that the decryption is only possible when a
user is able to recreates the encoded value which was used to mask the message.
Any ABE scheme has to be collision-resistant to be ensure security of the data. In other words,
users cannot combine their decryption keys to gain access to encrypted data when none of them is
initially authorized. This can be ensured by choosing an independent polynomial embedding unique
random elements for each user’s share (secret keys) as in [61, 85], or by using a masking technique
which uniquely randomizes the user’s secret key as in [11]. In the homomorphic ABE [60], the
collision is not possible since each user’s secret key hides a different “translation table" and hence
even if two users collude, they will not be able to decrypt if none of them can independently satisfy
the circuit predicate.
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Revocation of user’s secret key is another important requirement for ABE schemes. One naive
revoking approach is to generate new public key and master key and update all users’ secret keys
except for the revoked user’s. However this approach is infeasible in practice since it requires invoking
the setup and key generation functions, and re-encrypting the existing ciphertexts with the new public
key. Alternatively, the scheme can include time stamps [81] as additional attributes which state an
expiry dateTS for each generated secret key and an encryption dateTS ′ for each ciphertext. Hence, a
user can decrypt only if their secret key’s expiry date is beyond the ciphertext’s last decryption date
(or TS ≥ TS ′).
Homomorphic ABE/IBE schemes provide means for data owners to control the access to their
encrypted messages. Homomorphic evaluations can be performed but only on ciphertexts encrypted
under the same identity or attributes. Several works [37] in the literature proposed multi-identity
IBE schemes, which support computation on ciphertexts under different identities. However, the
users with those identities are required to cooperate in a distributed decryption. The design of these
schemes is similar in the design to multi-key HE schemes, discussed in the subsequent section, which
support homomorphic evaluations on ciphertexts encrypted under different keys.
5 MULTI-KEY APPROACHES
Many outsourced computations require homomorphic evaluations on data provided by different
owners and encrypted using their own keys. For example in Fig. 1c, the function, or trained model, f
takes two inputs [x]A and [y]B encrypted under Alice’s and Bob’s public keys, respectively. Single-
key approaches, discussed in previous section, enable re-encryption or decryption of ciphertexts
with a different key, but computations must be performed under the same key. Multi-key approaches
extend many base HE schemes to support homomorphic evaluation with data encrypted by multiple
keys.
In general, HE schemes can be extended to threshold or multi-key settings, or a hybrid of both. In
threshold HE schemes (ThHE), participants generate a joint public key pk∗ in advance from their
individual public keys, e.g., a linear combination of their public keys as shown in Fig. 7a. Inputs
are homomorphically encrypted and evaluated under this joint key pk∗. In contrast, multi-key HE
schemes (MKHE) support “on-the-fly” evaluation under different keys without a prior key setup
as shown in Fig. 7b. A hybrid approach utilizing both ThHE and MKHE techniques can be used
to improve practicality in special scenarios, where a group of system users always participate in
evaluation.
In all three approaches, schemes are often often designed in the common reference string (CRS)
model as discussed in Sec. 3.1. This means the participants have access to a public parameter in
the form of a ring element and use it to generate their individual keys. This produces individual
keys that are related to each other and ensures correct computation with multiple keys. Moreover,
in all three approaches, decryption is commonly done in a distributed manner among participants
because no single user has the corresponding decryption key (i.e., the aggregation and concatenation
of individual secret keys for ThHE and MKHE, respectively).
We review in this section the fundamentals and challenges of the state-of-the-art approaches and
discuss their security and efficiency. For simplicity, we describe the notations use throughout this
section in Table 3.
5.1 Threshold Homomorphic Encryption
Supporting homomorphic computations on inputs from different data owners without compromising
data privacy requires data to be encrypted under individual’s keys. Threshold encryption is a common
approach for fulfilling this requirement, with the generation of a joint key in a key setup before any
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Fig. 7. Encryption step of schemes supporting multiple keys.
Table 3. Notations specific to multi-key approaches.
Category Notation Description
ThHE-specific
N Total number of users in the system.
T Required number (threshold) of secret shares to decrypt.
pk∗ A joint public key generated from individual public keys {pk1, . . . , pkN }
sk∗ A joint secret key, secretly shared among N users.
ek∗ A joint evaluation key generated corresponding to pk∗.
MKHE-specific
K A bound on number of keys we can extend a ciphertext under.
K Total number of keys, such that K ≤ K
p¯k An extended public key concatenated as (pk1, . . . , pkK )
s¯k An extended secret key concatenated as (sk1, . . . , skK )
e¯k An extended evaluation key generated corresponding to p¯k.
c¯ An extended ciphertext encrypted under the concatenated public keys.
Distributed decryption ρi The decryption component constructed by the i-th user in distributed decryption.
computation. This joint key can be changed or revoked at any point but with the cost of rerunning the
key setup and re-encrypting all input data.
In a threshold encryption scheme [8, 14, 43, 44], a set of users can encrypt their data under a joint
key but have to cooperate for decryption. Shamir’s secret sharing [88] forms the base of threshold
schemes. Mainly, a secret s is divided into shares si and distributed among N users, such that no
single user knows the secret s. The secret is reconstructed if and only if a predefined number of
shares (say a threshold T ) are provided. This threshold encryption scheme follows the design of
Shamir’s (T ,N ) threshold scheme.
The threshold value T is chosen according to the security model and requirements. For example, if
all N users in the system are required to participate in decryption, the threshold T is set to T = N .
This setting follows a dishonest-majority assumption, whereT ≥ N /2 system users may be corrupted.
In this case, even with N − 1 corrupted users, it is not possible to decrypt. This assumption can be
relaxed to a honest-majority assumption, which implies that the number of dishonest users is less
than N /2 and a subset of users can decrypt. On the other hand, if every user in the system has the
right to independently decrypt, the threshold is set toT = 1 which corresponds to threshold broadcast
encryption [27, 42, 56].
A ThHE scheme combines threshold functionality with the ability to compute on encrypted data un-
der a joint key. There are three main components in ThHE schemes: a distributed key setup protocol, a
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homomorphic encryption function, and a distributed decryption protocol [87]. Formally, we can define
a general ThHE scheme as tuple of PPT algorithms ThHE = (Setup, JointKeyGen, Enc, Eval,Dec).
- ThHE.Setup(1λ) → ((pk1, sk1) . . . , (pkN , skN )): Given a security parameter λ, the setup algo-
rithm outputs a set of N key pairs (pki , ski ).
- ThHE.JointKeyGen(pk1, . . . , pkN ) → pk∗, ek∗: Given the input of N public keys (pk1, . . . , pkN ),
the interactive algorithm outputs a joint public key pk∗ and the evaluation key ek∗, if required.
- ThHE.Enc(pk∗,m) → c: Given a joint public key pk∗ and a message m, the encryption
algorithm outputs a ciphertext c.
- ThHE.Eval(pk∗, f , c, c ′) → ceval: Given a joint public key pk∗ and two ciphertexts c, c ′, the
evaluation algorithm outputs the evaluated ciphertext ceval = f (c, c ′).
- ThHE.PartDec(ski , c) → ρi Given a ciphertext c encrypted under pk∗ and a secret share of the
key ski , perform the partial decryption algorithm and output a partially decrypted message ρi .
- ThHE.Combine(ρ1, . . . , ρT ) → m: Given a set of partial decryptions (ρ1, . . . , ρT ) for some
threshold set, combine decryption components to perform the final decryption and output the
messagem.
In earlier threshold schemes in the literature [39, 44], the joint key pair may be generated first
by a trusted dealer, then the public key and shares of the secret key are distributed among users.
Alternatively, the public key can be generated from users’ individual public keys, as implied in
ThHE.JointKeyGen, and they need to collaborate to decrypt with their individual secret keys at
the end of computation. The two algorithms ThHE.PartDec and ThHE.Combine are the routines
performed in distributed decryption, which we discussed as a common technique in Sec. 3.3.3.
Another way to decrypt may utilize the key switching technique (Sec. 3.3.1) to re-encrypt the
ciphertext result from an encryption under the joint key to one under the intended user’s key.
This method avoids performing distributed decryption and enable the user to directly decrypt with
their own secret key. But, this method can lead to security problem as discussed in Sec.4.1.5.
Mouchet et al. [74] proposed two versions of key switching, depending on whether parties have
access to the shares of the new secret or public key, based on their construction of multiparty HE
cryptosystem. In the rest of this section, we survey ThHE schemes based on two defined security
assumptions, dishonest-majority, and honest-majority.
5.1.1 Dishonest-majority threshold HE. Many HE schemes can be extended to a threshold
setting by leveraging the additive homomorphism of the key space. This property enables the
establishment of a joint key from individual keys that are generated and owned by individual users
without a trusted party. By direct aggregation of the users’ public keys, we can effortlessly set up a
(N -out-of-N ) threshold encryption scheme following the dishonest-majority model. In other words,
threshold HE transforms the setting from computing with different keys to computing with a single
joint key.
Both ElGamal and Paillier schemes can be extended to a threshold version [39, 44, 79]. The
aggregation of public keys in the former is less complex than the latter. Specifically in the multiplica-
tively homomorphic ElGamal scheme, assume we have a set of N users where each user i has an
independently generated key pair (pki = дsi , ski = si ), where д is a group generator. Then, the joint
key is computed as pk∗ =
∏N
i=1 pki = д
∑N
i=1 si = дs
∗
. A user can encrypt data under the generated
joint public key pk∗ with a uniform random r for semantic security as c = (c0, c1) = (дr ,m · (дs∗ )r ).
Homomorphic computations can be done on the ciphertext using the homomorphic primitives of the
scheme. Decryption of ciphertexts must be performed with the help of all N users to remove the
element дr s
∗
from c1. In particular, each user i uses their own secret key si to construct a component
ρi = (c0)−si = (дr )−si = д−r si such that combining these components yields ∑Ni=1 ρi = д−r s∗ . Then,
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each user i takes turn and uses their component ρi to partially remove their secret key si by computing
cˆ1 · ρi =m · дr s∗ · д−r si . After partial decryption by all parties, we yield a plaintext messagem.
In a similar manner, (R)LWE-based HE schemes can also be extended to a threshold setting.
Asharov et al. [8] proposed a threshold variant of the BGV scheme [22] that we present in Scheme 8.
The scheme is designed as a 3-round MPC protocol, where the joint public key pk∗ and the joint
evaluation key ek∗ are generated in the first two rounds, and the distributed decryption is performed
in the third round. Formally, given a set of N public keys pki = (bi ,a) = (asi + tei ,a), where the
element a ∈ Rq is a shared element in the CRS model and si is the i-th user’s secret key. We generate
a joint public key pk∗ = (∑Ni=1 bi ,a) such that we obtain (a∑Ni=1 si +t ∑Ni=1 ei ,a) = (as∗+te∗,a). Note
that only the first component b of the individual public keys is aggregated such that the underlying
secret keys si are homomorphically added under the RLWE assumption. If we add both components
of all the public keys, the joint key will be pk∗ = (as∗+te∗,Na). Subsequently, a ciphertext encrypted
under the joint key will be c = (c0, c1) = (ras∗ + te∗ +m,Nra). Obviously, the decryption c0 − c1s∗
will fail because (Nras∗ , ras∗).
Scheme 8: A Threshold-variant of BGV scheme [8]
- ThBGV.Setup(1λ , 1L): Given the security parameter λ and a multiplicative depth L, run
BGV.Setup and output pp = (d, χ ,ψ ,q, t ,a) as the public parameters of scheme. Let a←Rℓq
be the shared CRS vector.
- ThBGV.KeyGen(pp): Given the public parameters pp, choose a←a and uniformly sample a
set of N secrets si ←ψ and errors ei ← χ , where i ∈ {1, . . . ,N }. Output the set of key pairs
((pk1, sk1) . . . , (pkn , skN )) such as pki = (asi + tei ,a) and ski = si .
- ThBGV.JointKeyGen(pk1, . . . , pkN ): Given the input of N public keys (pk1, . . . , pkN ), ag-
gregate the first component of pki to generate the joint public key as pk
∗ = (∑(asi + tei ),a).
- ThBGV.EvalKeyGen(sk1, . . . , skN ): Given a set of N secret keys ski = si , jointly compute
the evaluation key as ek∗ =
∑
1≤i, j≤N ({Enc(pk∗,
∑
si [α]sj [β])}) where 0 ≤ α , β < d are the
indices of coefficients of the secret keys.
- ThBGV.Enc(pk∗,m): Given a joint public key pk∗ and a messagem, the encryption algorithm
outputs a ciphertext c = (c0, c1) where c0 = r (as∗ + te∗) +m and c1 = ra.
- ThBGV.Eval(pk∗, f ,c,c ′): Given a joint public key pk∗ and two ciphertexts c,c ′, the evalu-
ation algorithm outputs the evaluated ciphertext ceval = f (c,c ′). Similar to the base BGV
scheme, the evaluation function f can be either homomorphic addition or multiplication.
- ThBGV.Relinearize(ek∗, c˜mult): Given the joint evaluation key ek∗ and the long ciphertext
c˜mult = (c˜0, c˜1, c˜2), perform relinearization similar to BGV.Relinearize to output cmult =
(c0, c1).
- ThBGV.PartDec(ski ,c): Given a ciphertext c encrypted under pk∗ and a secret share of the
key ski , generate a decryption component as ρi = (c1si + te ′i ).
- ThBGV.Combine(ρ1, . . . , ρN ,c): Given decryption components (ρ1, . . . , ρN ), decrypt the
ciphertext as c0 −∑i ρi (mod t).
As mentioned, homomorphic multiplication requires additional evaluation keys to perform relin-
earization that brings the quadratic ciphertext in (s∗)2 back to be linear in s∗. Recall that the evaluation
key encrypts the powers of base of the secret key (s∗)2 = (s1 + · · · + sN )2. Since the secret key is
shared among N users, they cannot simply calculate the sum of the square of their individually
generated secret keys si , because (s21 + · · · + s2N ) , (s1 + · · · + sN )2. The generation of this evaluation
key ek∗ is trickier than the public key due to its fundamentally complex structure. It requires all N
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parties to cooperate in a 2-round setup phase to compute the joint evaluation key from their secret
shares. Let 0 ≤ α , β < d be the indexes of coefficients of the secret s∗, which is a polynomial with
degree d−1, and let ℓ ∈ {0, ⌊logq⌋}. In the first round, every party will broadcast {Enc(pk∗, t ℓsi [α])},
which is a set of encryption of all the powers of base t of the i-th secret share’s coefficients. Note if
we aggregate the shares from all parties, we will obtain {Enc(pk∗, t ℓ · s∗[α])}. In the second round,
each party performs a pairwise multiplication between the coefficients of the aggregated encrypted
secret key s∗ and the coefficients of its secret shares si , yielding ek∗ = {Enc(pk∗, t ℓ · s∗[α] · si [β])}.
Combining the shares from all parties in the second round outputs the joint evaluation key {ek∗},
such that for a←Rq , the evaluation key is ek∗ = (as∗ + te + t ℓ · s∗ · s∗,a). To avoid making circular
security assumption, the secret (s∗)2 should be encrypted under a different secret s∗, hence we can
generate L joint keys, one for each level l ∈ L, and encrypt (s∗l−1)2 corresponding to level l − 1 under
pk∗l as discussed in Sec. 4.1.1.
To decrypt, each user contributes their partial key si by computing the component ρi = c1si + tei .
Then, all users collaboratively produce a component that contains the sum of all secret keys shares,
that is
∑N
i=1 ρi = (c1
∑N
i=1 si + t
∑N
i=1 ei ) = (c1s∗ + te∗) = ρ∗. Refer to the decryption process
Dec(sk,c) = c0 − ρ∗, the message can be decrypted correctly when computing c0 − (c1s∗ + te∗).
These (N ,N ) threshold schemes enable the group of N users to homomorphically compute on their
data that is encrypted under a joint key from their individual keys. Decryption however is impossible
unless all of them participate with their secret shares. In practice, this may become a single point of
failure if a user becomes uncooperative or was offline at the time for decryption. Hence, designing
a more flexible threshold scheme is necessary where only a subset of secret shares is sufficient to
decrypt.
5.1.2 Honest-majority threshold HE. Threshold HE scheme proposed by Asharov et al [8]
targets a dishonest-majority security assumption. However, some applications may need to relax this
assumption to an honest-majority one to avoid single point of failure by enabling only a subset of
keys to decrypt. Desmedt and Frankel [44] proposed a threshold version of ElGamal scheme [47]
where only T users out of N are needed to decrypt. The scheme leverages Shamir’s linear secret
sharing [88]. Given a threshold T and a large prime p as parameters, a trusted dealer performs a key
setup as follows. The dealer uniformly sample a secret key s∗ mod p and set it as the constant term of
a random polynomial f (x)mod p, such that f (0) = s∗. The degree of this polynomial is determined as
T − 1 if we wantT users to reconstruct the secret. The dealer then uses this polynomial to generate N
secret shares si = f (i) mod p as unique points for each user i ∈ {1,N }. Finally,broadcast pk∗ = дs∗
as the joint public key and keep both s∗ and f (x) secret from the users. The intuition is that Lagrange
interpolation can be used to reconstruct the secret s∗ if at least T points (shares) were provided.
Each user can encrypt a message mi as (ai ,bi ) = (дri ,miдri s∗ ) using the public key дs∗ and a
random value ri . However, at least T users are required to use their secret shares to decrypt. This
construction of threshold ElGamal requires a trusted dealer to generate and distribute the secret in
the key setup. Pedersen [79] improved the scheme later by removing the need for this trusted dealer
at key setup and enabled validation of the secret shares for robustness. However, the decryption still
requires a trusted key authority to generate the unique polynomial and decrypt.
Threshold schemes proposed after that were based on different encryption schemes [38, 92], not
necessarily homomorphic, and removed the need of this trusted dealer by relying on Diffie-Hellman
key generation instead, such as in threshold RSA [41, 82].
Boneh et al [16] proposed the first (T -out-of-N ) ThHE scheme based on LWE problem. In this
scheme, the decryption key is split into N shares among the participants. Shamir’s linear secret
sharing scheme (LSSS) technique is also leveraged here to allow T key shares to sufficiently decrypt
according to a defined threshold access structure. Moreover, a universal thresholdizer was proposed
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to extend general HE schemes to threshold HE schemes. Specifically, a universal thresholdizer split a
given cryptographic key into N valid shares that can be used as individual public keys.
5.1.3 Discussion. Key management in ThHE schemes is essential to system security. In the key
setup, the joint key is often generated based on participants’ individual keys before any computation.
Each user encrypts their inputs under this one joint key to produce compact ciphertexts, which means
the ciphertext size is independent of the number of users N . The security depends on the fact that
no single user has the decryption key, which can be only constructed if a threshold set of users
cooperated. The joint key can be revoked when a user is added or removed at any point, but this
requires running the threshold key setup again and re-encrypting all inputs with the new joint key. It
may be a better choice to leverage ThHE schemes in outsourced computations if participants do not
change often. If they do, the efficiency quickly degrades because the joint key needs to be updated
accordingly. In this case, a more flexible approach is needed to allow computation with multiple keys
“on-the-fly" when required.
Potentially, we investigate if the key homomorphism can be used to directly transform ciphertexts
from encryptions under individual keys to ones encrypted under a joint key without prior key setup.
For example in the threshold BGV scheme [8], let [m]A = (c0, c1) = (ra(sA) + teA +m, ra) be a
ciphertext encrypting a messagem under Alice’s public key pkA. A cloud evaluator may perform joint
homomorphic evaluation on this ciphertext for Alice and Bob such that the result is encrypted under
their joint key pkAB . Using Bob’s public key pkB = (asB+teB ,a), the cloud can construct a component
ξB = (rasB + teB ) which is the encryption of zero if the randomness r is known. Then, the cloud can
add this component to the ciphertext as [m]AB = (c0 + ξB , c1) = (ra(sA + sB ) + t(eA + eB ) +m, ra),
which is an encryption under pkAB .
Unfortunately, this approach has two major flaws which breaches the security of the scheme.
First, the encryption randomness r may need to be fixed and shared with the cloud similar to the
CRS element a. Recall that the BGV scheme encryption algorithm depends on r to randomize the
ciphertexts. Fixing this element renders deterministic encryption scheme which loses its semantic
security property. i.e., encrypting the same message at different times will yield the same ciphertexts.
The second flaw is more vital since this technique relies on disclosing the randomness r to the cloud
evaluator. Obviously, this break the security of the scheme. Specifically, given a ciphertext [m]A, the
cloud evaluator can easily decrypt it by constructing a component (rasA) using the public key pkA
and compute m˜ = c0 − rasA = m + teA (mod q), which removes the large element rasA and yield
m = m˜ (mod t).
Due to these security issues, ThHE cannot be simply modified to support on-the-fly computation
with different keys. Alternatively, a multi-key technique targets this problem and extends HE schemes
to dynamic transformation of ciphertexts by concatenating the different public keys and treating them
as one key. We review this technique in depth in the following section.
5.2 Multi-key Homomorphic Encryption
The first notion of multi-key HE (MKHE) schemes was introduced by López-Alt et al. [69] to support
the homomorphic evaluation on ciphertexts encrypted under different keys. Compared to ThHE
schemes, this type of HE schemes remove the need of a key setup phase to generate a joint key
from individual keys prior to any computation. Instead, a cloud evaluator can dynamically extend
ciphertexts from encryption under individual keys to ones under the concatenation of individual
users’ keys (pk1, . . . , pkK ). However, both ThHE and MKHE schemes are similar in requiring users
to cooperate and run a distributed decryption protocol when retrieving the evaluated result.
We categorize MKHE scheme as single-hop if the extended ciphertext cannot be further ex-
tended to additional keys after being homomorphically evaluated. Otherwise, we categorize them as
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multi-hop MKHE schemes. In general, an MKHE scheme is a tuple of PPT algorithms MKHE =
(Setup,KeyGen, Enc, Extend, EvalKeyGen, Eval,Dec). We formally define each algorithm as follow.
- MKHE.Setup(1λ , 1K ) → pp: Given a security parameter λ and a bound K on the number of
keys, the setup algorithm outputs the public parameters pp.
- MKHE.KeyGen(pp) → (pk, sk): Given the public parameters pp, the key generation algorithm
outputs a public key pk, a private key sk.
- MKHE.Enc(pk,m) → c: Given a public key pk and a message m, the encryption algorithm
outputs a ciphertext c.
- MKHE.Extend({pk1, · · · , pkK }, c) → c¯: Given a set of K public keys pk1, · · · , pkK where
K ≤ K, and a ciphertext c, the output is the extended ciphertext c¯ under the concatenated
public key p¯k.
- MKHE.EvalKeyGen(p¯k) → e¯k: Given a concatenated public key p¯k generate the correspond-
ing evaluation (linearization) key e¯k.
- MKHE.Eval(p¯k, f , c¯, c¯ ′) → ceval: Given two extended ciphertexts c¯, c¯ ′ under the same concate-
nated public key p¯k, the evaluation algorithm outputs the evaluated ciphertext c¯eval = f (c¯, c¯ ′).
- MKHE.Dec((sk1, . . . , skK ), c¯) →m: Given a set of concatenated secret shares (sk1, . . . , skK )
and an extended ciphertext c¯, the interactive decryption algorithm performs decryption and
outputs the messagem
To design an MKHE scheme, two main points have to be addressed: the generation of the
evaluation key and maintaining the encryption randomness. Homomorphic multiplication on the
extended ciphertexts requires providing an evaluation key corresponding to the concatenated key
to perform dimension reduction (i.e., relinearization). Also, decryption in its essence depends on
canceling out the large randomized elements in the ciphertext to retrieve the message. Hence, we
must ensure that decrypting with different secret keys is done correctly in MKHE schemes, i.e., it
does not yield remaining randomized elements.
5.2.1 MKHE via onion encryption. In theory, any standard HE scheme can be extended to
mutli-key for a constant number of keys through an onion encryption and decryption technique [69].
This technique is similar to onion routing [58] used in anonymous communication in Tor [45].
López-Alt et al. [69] shows an HE construction for encrypting a message m under multiple keys.
Given an HE scheme which encrypts a messagem ∈ Zt , say t = 2, into a ciphertext c ∈ Zq . In this
scenario, letm be bit-decomposed such thatm = (m1, . . . ,mℓ) ∈ {0, 1}ℓ for a bit length ℓ. Define the
bit-wise encryption of a messagem and the decryption of ciphertext c as following.
Enc(pk,m) = (Enc(pk,m1), . . . , Enc(pk,mℓ))
Dec(sk, c) = (Dec(sk, c1), . . . ,Dec(sk, cℓ))
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Fig. 8. Achieving MKHE via onion encryption.
Now, define the onion encryption and decryption for a message m under a set of K ∈ N keys as
following.
Enc∗(pk,m) = Enc(pk,m)
Enc∗(pk1, . . . , pkK ,m) = Enc∗(pkK , pkK−1, . . . , Enc(pk1,m))
= Enc(pkK , Enc(pkK−1, . . . , Enc(pk1,m)))
Dec∗(sk, c) = Dec(sk, c)
Dec∗(sk1, . . . , skK , c) = Dec∗(skK−1 . . . , sk1,Dec(skK , c))
= Dec(sk1,Dec(sk2, . . . ,Dec(skK , c)))
Figure 8 shows an example of this HE scheme which adds encryption layers repeatedly to extend
ciphertexts to additional keys. Retrieving the result is done by applying decryption in reverse order
of encryption using the set of corresponding secret keys.
Before adding a new encryption layer, the ciphertext is represented in binary as c ∈ {0, 1}µ , where
µ = poly(λ) for some polynomial poly(·). Each layer of encryption expands the ciphertext size by
a factor of µ because the encryption function Enc(pk,m) outputs a bit-wise encrypted ciphertexts.
Hence, the size of a ciphertext grows exponentially with each additional encryption layer. Specifically,
in the case where a message space {0, 1} and a ciphertext space {0, 1}µ , the size of a ciphertext
encrypted under K keys is approximately µK . Due to this large ciphertext expansion after each layer,
onion encryption method is feasible only for a very small number of keys, which must be chosen
before computation.
Given K ciphertexts ci = Enc(pki ,mi ), we can extend them to be encryptions under K key via
onion encryption described above. Homomorphic operations are performed on ciphertexts encrypted
under the same set of keys but must be in order. The result is decrypted with the corresponding
ordered secret keys such that Dec∗(sk1, . . . , skK , f (m1, . . . ,mK )) = f (m1, . . . ,mK ).
As mentioned before, this technique is generic to extend any standard HE scheme to the multi-key
setting. It proposes the notion of on-the-fly computation, but a minimum setup is required before
computation; i.e., choosing the number of keys K as a parameter. Onion encryption shares the setup
requirement with ThHE schemes. A key setup phase must be done in the ThHE to generate the joint
key from participants’ keys, and in onion encryption the number of keys is selected. However, onion
encryption has a restriction on the order of evaluations and decryptions as they must be done in the
order of the keys. In contrast, evaluations in ThHE are performed on data encrypted under the joint
key, and decryption is done in a distributed manner that does not depend on the order.
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Scheme 9: The López-Alt-Tromer-Vaikuntanathan (LTV) scheme [69]
- LTV.Setup(1λ): Given a security parameter λ, choose a cyclotomic polynomial Φ(x) = xd + 1
and define R = Z[x]/(Φ(x)) as a polynomial ring of degree d with integer coefficients. Let Rq
be the quotient ring R/qR where q is a modulus and χ be an error distribution. Output the set
of parameters pp = (d,q, χ ).
- LTV.KeyGen(pp): Given a security parameter λ, sample f ′,д← χ . Compute f = 2f ′ + 1. If
f is not invertible in Rq , re-sample. Otherwise, find f −1 and set h = 2д f −1 ∈ Rq . Output the
key pair as (pk, sk) = (h, f ).
- LTV.EvalKeyGen(f ): Given the secret key f , output the evaluation key ek = h ·u ′+2e ′+ f ·д ∈
Rq , where u ′,e ′← χ ℓ .
- LTV.Enc(pk,m): Given a public key pk = h and a messagem ∈ {0, 1}. Sample u, e ← χ and
output the ciphertext as c = hu + 2e +m ∈ Rq .
- LTV.Eval(p¯k, f , c1, . . . , ck ): Given a set of public keys p¯k = (pk1, . . . , pkK ) and k ciphertexts,
perform the evaluation f and output c¯eval. Evaluation can be addition or multiplication. For
addition, output c¯add = c¯1+ · · ·+c¯k ∈ Rq . For multiplication, perform ¯˜cmult = c¯1 · . . . ·c¯k ∈ Rq .
- LTV.Relinearize({ek1, . . . , ekK }, ¯˜cmult): Given a ciphertext ¯˜cmult = c¯ · c¯ ′, output c¯mult =
¯˜cmult if c¯, c¯ ′ are encrypted under the same extended key. Otherwise, for the set of k additional
keys in p¯k∩ ¯pk′, let c0 = ¯˜cmult and compute c j = ⟨д−1(c j−1), ekj ⟩ (mod q). Output c¯mult = ck .
- LTV.Dec((sk1, . . . , skK ), c¯): Given a set of secret keys (sk1, . . . , skK ) = { f1, . . . , fK } and an
extended ciphertext c¯, perform the decryption as z = f1, . . . , fnc¯ ∈ Rq . Output the result as
m = z (mod 2).
López-Alt et al. [69] proposed an MKHE based on NTRU HE scheme [95], which we describe in
Scheme 9. Let c1 = h1u1 + 2e1 +m1 and c2 = h2u2 + 2e2 +m2 be two ciphertexts encrypted under
two public keys h1,h2. We can add them and correctly decrypt to the sum using the joint secret keys
of f1 f2 as long as the noise eadd is not too large. Also, note that f1 ≡ f2 ≡ 1 (mod 2).
f1 f2(c1 + c2) = f1 f2h1u1 + 2f1 f2e1 + f1 f2m1 + f1 f2h2u2 + 2f1 f2e2 + f1 f2m2
= f1 f2(h1u1 + h2u2) + 2f1 f2(e1 + e2) + f1 f2(m1 +m2)
= 2(f2д1u1 + f1д2u2 + f1 f2e1 + f1 f2e2) + f1 f2(m1 +m2)
= 2eadd + f1 f2(m1 +m2)
=m1 +m2 (mod 2)
Similarly, we can decrypt to the product using the joint secret keys f1 f2 as following.
f1 f2(c1c2) = f1 f2(h1u1 + 2e1 +m1)(h2u2 + 2e2 +m2)
= f1 f2h1u1h2u2 + 2f1 f2h1u1e2 + f1 f2h1u1m1 + 2f1 f2h2u2e1 + 4f1 f2e1e2
+ 2f1 f2e1m2 + f1 f2m1h2u2 + 2f1 f2m1e2 + f1 f2m1m2
= 4д1u1д2u2 + 4f2д1u1e2 + 2f2д1u1m1 + 4f1д2u2e1 + 4f1 f2e1e2
+ 2f1 f2e1m2 + 2f1m1д2u2 + 2f1 f2m1e2 + f1 f2(m1m2)
= 2emult + f1 f2(m1m2) =m1m2 (mod 2)
A naive decryption in LTV requires keys to be constructed based on the evaluated circuit. For
example, the ciphertext c21c2 is decrypted by multiplying it with the keys f
2
1 f2, and c1c2 + c2c3 is
decrypted with the keys f1 f 22 f3. In other words, the power of the secret key fi corresponds to the
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Table 4. Comparison between proprieties of existing different MKHE schemes.
Scheme Security
Ctxt size
growth
Protocol
rounds Multi-hop
Bounded #
of keys CRS Packing
Need
bootstrapping
LTV12 [69] NTRU Quadratic - ✓ ✓
CM15 [37]
LWE
Quadratic - ✓
MW16 [75] Quadratic 2 ✓
PS16 [80] Quadratic 2 ✓ ✓ ✓
BP16 [23] Linear 2 ✓ ✓ ✓
DHRW16 [46] piO Quadratic 2 ✓ ✓
CZW17 [32]
RLWE
Linear 2 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
YKHK18 [104] Linear 2 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
LZYH+19 [66] Linear 2 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
CDKS19 [30] Linear 2 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
AH19 [4] Constant 4 ∗ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
CCS19 [29] TLWE Linear 2 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
∗ Two extra rounds are for the ThHE setup phase to generate the joint key.
times the ciphertext ci is used in the evaluated circuit. This impacts the efficiency of the scheme since
the size of the decryption key grows based on both the number of involved keys and the depth of
the circuit. Instead, they apply key switching on evaluated ciphertexts to make keys independent of
the circuit. Specifically, the technique makes a ciphertext decryptable with fi instead of f 2i , e.g., the
ciphertext c1c2 + c2c3 is decrypted with f1 f2 f3 instead of f1 f 22 f3.
After the LTV scheme, many works propose MKHE constructions with different capabilities and
security assumptions. We provide a comparison of these different schemes in Table 4. Observed from
the table, we can improve the ciphertext size from growing quadratically in early works [46, 69, 75,
80] to growing linearly with the number of keys in the recent works [23, 30, 32, 66]. The majority of
schemes are multi-hop, which means an extended ciphertext can be further extended to additional
keys after homomorphic evaluations. Most schemes [30, 32, 75, 80] also require key generation to
use a public parameter in the CRS model. Moreover, the RLWE-based MKHE schemes [4, 30, 32]
support packing multiple messages in one ciphertext which enables SIMD evaluations.
5.2.2 Single-hop MKHE. Clear and McGoldrick [37] proposed a compiler for a multi-identity
homomorphic IBE scheme based on the GSW scheme [55]. As discussed in Sec. 4.3, this compiler
produces ciphertexts that are encrypted under different identities, instead of only supporting single-
identity in the original GSW scheme. Identities can be viewed as an analog to keys in HE schemes;
hence, we can also obtain a multi-key HE scheme in this way. Mukherjee and Wichs [75] improved
this IBE-based MKHE and built a general two-round MPC protocol on top of it, including the first
introduction of a detailed distributed decryption protocol. We describe the latter multi-key variant of
the GSW in Scheme 10.
Compared to the LTV scheme [69], the new GSW-based scheme does not limit the maximum
number of keys the ciphertext can be extended to. But, the ciphertext cannot be further extended
after performing a homomorphic evaluation.
To understand how the scheme works, let us consider the following toy example. Let C1 =
A1R1 +m1G be a fresh GSW ciphertext encrypted with the public key pk1 = A1 = (b1,B), where
B is a shared matrix in the CRS model. For the corresponding secret key sk1 = s1, the property
s1C1 ≈m1s1G holds as mentioned in Sec. 4.1.3.
To involve this ciphertext in an homomorphic evaluation with another ciphertext under a different
key, we need to extend it first to the new key. Suppose pk2 = (b2,B) is another public key which
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Scheme 10: The Mukherjee-Wichs MKHE scheme [75]
- MW.Setup(1λ , 1L): Given a security parameter λ and a circuit depth L, run the GSW.Setup
and choose B←Z(n−1)×nℓq as a common shared matrix among users. Output the set of public
parameters pp = (q,n,ψ , χ ,B).
- MW.KeyGen(pp): Given the public parameters pp, run the key generation algorithm
GSW.Setup for each user and output the individual key pair (pk, sk) = (A, s) where
A = (b = s`B + e,B) and s = (1,−s`) where s` ←ψ .
- MW.Enc(pk,m): To encrypt a message bitm with the public key pk = A and a randomness R,
run GSW.Enc to obtain the GSW ciphertext C = AR +mG. Additionally, encrypt each entry
of the randomness R such that U = {U α,β }α,β=1, ...,nℓ where U α,β = Enc(pk, rα,β ). Output
the ciphertext as Output the ciphertext as the pair Cˆ = (U ,C).
- MW.Extend((pk1, . . . , pkK ), Cˆ): Given a list of K public keys (pk1, . . . , pkK ) and a ciphertext
Cˆ = (U ,C) encrypting a message m under pki , compute the auxiliary matrix X j = b j − bi
for each pkj,i . Construct a matrix C¯ ∈ ZnK×nℓKq such that each sub-matrix C¯a,b ∈ Zn×nℓ for
a,b ∈ 1, . . . ,K is defined as follows.
C¯a,b =

C, if a = b
X j , if a = i , j and b = j
0n×nℓ, otherwise
Output C¯ as the extended ciphertext under the concatenated key p¯k = (pk1, . . . , pkK ). For the
corresponding secret key s¯k = (sk1, . . . , skK ), the property (s1, . . . , sK )C ≈m(s1, . . . , sK )G¯
holds, where G¯ = InK ⊗ д.
- MW.Eval(p¯k, f , C¯1, . . . , C¯u ): Given a set of u extended ciphertexts (C¯1, . . . , C¯u ), directly per-
form the original GSW evaluation algorithms GSW.Add and GSW.Mult but in the extended
dimensions nK × nℓK .
- MW.Dec(s¯k, C¯): Let C¯ be an extended ciphertext C¯ encrypted under K concatenated keys s¯k
and consisting of K sub-matrices, such that V i includes the ciphertext C and the auxiliary
matrix X i . Each party i performs locally the partial decryption using their secret ski and V i
and output ρi = siC¯iG¯
−1(w¯T ) + ei , where w¯ = (0, . . . , 0, ⌈q/2⌉) and ei is a smudging noise.
The message is retrieved asm =
⌊∑Ki=1(ρi )q/2 ⌉.
encrypts a ciphertextC2. Before performing evaluation betweenC1 andC2, we need to extend these
ciphertexts to the other public keys. We extend C1 to pk2 as C¯1 =
(
C1 0
0 C1
)
∈ Z2n×2nℓ , which is
encrypted under the concatenated key (pk1, pk2). The same process applies to extendingC2 to pk1,
but we will focus our discussion on C1. Note that, the property (s1, s2)C¯1 ≈ m1(s1, s2)G¯, where
G¯ = I 2n ⊗ д and I 2n is the identity matrix of dimension 2n, no longer holds.
Observe that
(
s1 s2
) (C1 0
0 C1
)
=
(
s1C1 s2C1
)
. Since s1 corresponds to the public key pk1 = A1,
we correctly get C1s1 ≈ m1s1G for the first element. Note that a correct decryption should obtain
m1(s1, s1)G. However, decrypting with s2 does not retrieve the message m1s2G alone because s2
does not cancel pk1 as s2A1 ≈ 0. Hence, it yields a “lingering” element (b1 − b2)R1 according to the
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decryption of s2C1 shown below.
s2(A1R1 +m1G) = s2A1R1 +m1s2G
= (1,−s`2)(b1,B)R1 +m1s2G
= (1,−s`2)(s`1BR1 + e,B) +m1s2G
= (s`1B − s`2B)R1 +m1s2G
= (b1 − b2)R1 +m1s2G
To solve this issue, we have to provide an auxiliary matrix X 2 such that s1X 2 = (b2 −b1)R1, which is
needed to eliminate this lingering element. To create this matrix, we need to provide the randomness
R1 that is used to encrypt the message m1 for semantic security but without disclosing it to avoid
security breach as we discussed in Sec. 5.1. We encrypt each element rα,β of the randomness matrix
R1 under pk1 asU α,β = R
′
α,βA1+rα,βG, where α , β are in the indexes and R′ is another randomness.
We provide this encrypted randomness R1 with the ciphertextC1 as the tuple (U ,C1).
At the ciphertext extension step, we define a matrix Zα,β = (0n×nℓ−1,b2 − b1) ∈ Zn×nℓq , which
means all entries are 0 except the last column is the vector b2 −b1. Note that b1,b2 are components of
the public keys pk1, pk2, respectively. Then we compute X 2 =
∑
α,β U α,β ·G−1(Zα,β ), such that the
property s1X 2,α,β ≈ rα,β (b2 − b1) holds. Finally, output the extended ciphertext as C¯1 =
(
C1 X 2
0 C1
)
.
This process can be generalized to extendingC1 to K different keys. For each additional key pkj ,
we compute the matrixX j such that s1X j ≈ (b j −b1)R1. The new structure of the extended ciphertext
is illustrated in Fig. 9a as follows.
C¯1 =
©­­­­«
C1 X 2 · · · XK
0 C1 · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 · · · C1
ª®®®®¬
∈ ZnK×nℓK
As observed, the dimension of the extended ciphertext matrix can increase quadratically with the
number of involved keys because we have to add the auxiliary matrix and an additional copy
of the ciphertext. With each extension, the dimension of the gadget matrix G is also changed in
correspondence with the size of the extended key. Namely, we create a (nK × nℓK) matrix where the
diagonal is the vector д = (20, . . . , 2ℓ−1).
Homomorphic evaluation on extended ciphertexts performs the usual GSW addition and multi-
plication. The only difference is performing on ciphertexts with higher dimensions based on the K
involved keys.
Let C¯eval be the result of some evaluations on C¯1 with respect to the concatenated key (pk1, pk2).
Suppose that we want to extend the result to an additional key pk3. In this case, we must provide an
encryption of the randomness Reval, associated with the ciphertext C¯eval, under the corresponding
set of keys so it can be used to generate X 3. However, it is not clear how to obtain such an encryption
for Reval. Note the randomness is affected by the homomorphic evaluation. For example, the
product of C¯1 with another ciphertext C¯2 under the same keys (pk1, pk2) may contain randomness
Reval ≈ R1 · R2, where R2 is a randomness associated with C¯ ′2. Constructing such term from the
encryptions is not trivial. The scheme does not describe either a method to dynamically extend the
matrix X 1 to other keys. Hence, this renders a single-hop scheme.
Given a ciphertext C¯ under (pk1, . . . , pkK ), previous MKHE schemes [37, 69] assumed the pres-
ence of a trusted party who holds all the corresponding secret keys (sk1, . . . , skK ) and can directly
decrypt. To achieve a stronger security and avoid disclosing individual secret keys to anyone, this
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scheme performs a one-round distributed decryption protocol (similar to the ThHE technique). Let C¯
be a ciphertext extended under K keys and composed of K sub-matrices such that C¯ = (C¯1, . . . , C¯K ),
C¯i ∈ Zn×nℓKq . All K participants will agree on a vector w¯ = (0, . . . , 0, ⌈q/2⌉) ∈ ZnK . In the one round
of the protocol, each participant i partially decrypts C¯ by locally computing a masked decryption
component ρi = siC¯iG¯
−1(w¯T ) + ei , where ei is a smudging noise used to protect si under LWE
according to the lemma in Sec. 3.3.3. After receiving the broadcast components (ρ1, . . . , ρK ), the
intended participant performs the final decryption by aggregating components as ρ =
∑K
i=1(ρi ) and
computingm =
⌊ ρq/2 ⌉ to retrieve the message.
Based on this scheme, Mukherjee and Wichs [75] constructed an MPC protocol with two rounds to
enable secure computation with multiple keys. In the first round, users encrypt their inputs with their
individual keys and output the ciphertexts and encryption of the randomness. Then, the evaluator
can dynamically extend a ciphertext to K different keys without knowing any secret components,
such as the encrypted randomness, and perform the homomorphic evaluations. In the second round,
each user helps in a distributed decryption protocol by partially decrypting a part of the extended
ciphertext such that the message is retrieved by combining these partial decryptions.
As mentioned, there is no limit on the number of involved keys K . Yet, the scheme is still not
robust because no additional keys, or even further homomorphic evaluations, can be supported on
evaluated ciphertexts. Moreover, the ciphertext size expansion is significant, which affects the overall
practicality of the scheme. We discuss techniques for realizing multi-hop MKHE schemes in the
following section.
5.2.3 Multi-hop MKHE. Recent MKHE schemes adopt new design that overcomes the limitations
of earlier MKHE schemes and allows ciphertext extension after homomorphic evaluation. We review
the state-of-the-art MKHE schemes and show how these schemes adopt the new design to support
multi-hop.
Multi-hop MK-variant of GSW. Building on the single-hop Mukhenrjee-Wichs scheme [75], two
concurrent works [23, 80] proposed techniques to extend it to the multi-hop setting.
Peikert and Shiehian [80] proposed a leveled scheme that is based on the Mukhenrjee-Wichs
scheme but has a new ciphertext structure and extension function. In the setup step, a public
parameter in the form of uniformly LWE matrix B←Zn×2nℓq is chosen. The ciphertext in the new
scheme consists of three components (C, F ,D) compared to the former ciphertext tuple (C,U ). The
componentC ∈ Zn×nℓq remains the same as an original GSW ciphertext of the messagem. The new
component F = BR +mG ∈ Zn×nℓq is the commitment of the messagem under the randomized public
parameter B. Note the message is protected since the randomness R is not disclosed. The randomness
is encrypted and provided as a ciphertext D ∈ Z2n2ℓ2×nℓq such that sD ≈ R holds.
Given a ciphertext (C, F ,D) under s1, we can extend it to a second key s2 as (C¯, F¯ , D¯), where
F¯ = F and D¯ is extended by padding it with rows and columns of zeros such that the new padded
component is D¯ = I 2nℓ ⊗
(
In
0n×n
)
· D ∈ Z4n2ℓ2×nℓq . Note that we denote all extended elements with a
bar on the top, such as D¯. The new structure of the extended ciphertext is C¯ =
(
C X
0 F
)
. Note that
decrypting s2F = s2(BR +mG) = b2R +ms2G where b2R is a lingering term. The component X
encrypts information of the inverse of this lingering term such that s1X ≈ −b2R which cancels the
resulted lingering term.
With this new design, as illustrated in Fig. 9b, it is possible to further extend the ciphertext C¯ to K
additional keys. Note in the Fig. 9, some elements in the extended ciphertexts have been substituted
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Fig. 9. A comparison between single-hop and multi-hop MK-variants of the GSW scheme
fromC1 to F . The new scheme is multi-hop because the randomness used in F ,D is tied to the same
public parameter rather than a new key at every key extension process. Hence, there is no need to
provide an encryption of some randomness under a specific key to construct the cancelling term, as
discussed in Sec. 5.2.2.
The size of the ciphertext grows quadratically with the number of involved keys. Hence, the
scheme is limited by a bounded number of keys. An alternative scheme is introduced by authors to
obtain smaller ciphertexts. Specifically, the extended ciphertext remains as a GSW encryption but the
additional extension information is embedded in its corresponding public key instead. This scheme
yields smaller ciphertexts but larger public keys, which reduces the space overhead since the number
of evaluated ciphertexts is likely to be more than the number of extended public keys. Both schemes
are leveled, which support homomorphic evaluations up to a predefined level, but they can be made
fully through the bootstrapping technique.
Brakerski and Perlman [23] proposed a fully MK-variant of GSW scheme to overcome the single-
hop limitation in [75]. Ciphertexts in the single-hop scheme cannot be further extended without being
decrypted and encrypted again. This process can be done homomorphically via bootstrapping, as
discussed in Sec. 3.3.2. Hence, the Brakerski-Perlman method depends on the use of bootstrapable
NAND gates for evaluation. Note that a NAND gate has a function completeness property, which
means we can support any other operation by combining a set of NAND gates. Let C1 and C2 be
two ciphertexts encrypted under two different keys pk1 and pk2. Evaluating a bootstrapable NAND
on the two ciphertexts homomorphically performs NAND(Dec(sk1,C1),Dec(sk2,C2)) and yields the
extended ciphertext C¯ that is encrypted under the concatenated keys (pk1, pk2). As observed, we
must provide as inputs the secret keys sk1, sk2 encrypted under their corresponding public keys to
enable homomorphic decryption. Therefore, a circular-security (see Sec. 2.3) assumption is required.
Moreover, the size of the ciphertexts can be significantly reduced in this scheme. As discussed in
Sec. 4.1.3, the decryption process can be sufficiently done with one single column vector of the
GSW ciphertext. Since we need to perform decryption first in the evaluation, the scheme proposes
to keep the last column of the ciphertext and discard the rest. Hence, the size of the ciphertexts
grows linearly, instead of quadratically, with the number of involved keys. There is no bound on
the number of because ciphertexts are refreshed after each evaluation which keeps the noise level
reduced. However, the bootstrapping can be slow and the efficiency of the scheme may degrade as
the number of bootstrapable gates increases.
MK-variant of BGV. The BGV scheme [22] is one among the first RLWE-based schemes to enable
ciphertext packing, where multiple messages can be packed in one ciphertext to support efficient
SIMD computation. The first attempt of extending the BGV scheme [22] to multi-key setting was
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by López-Alt et al. [69]. Unfortunately, this initial MKHE scheme did not support key switching
technique (see Sec. 3.3.1) or bootstrapping which prevented extending it to a leveled or FHE scheme.
Later, Chen et al. [32] proposed a multi-key variant of the BGV scheme that is multi-hop and
supports extending a ciphertext to a bounded number of keys. We describe this new multi-key BGV
(MKBGV) scheme in Scheme 11. Similar to other LWE-based MKHE schemes, the MKBGV scheme
is designed in the CRS model. Participants use a pre-shared vector a←Rℓq to generate their key pairs.
Messages are initially encrypted under a single key following the base BGV encryption function
discussed in Sec. 4.1.1.
Scheme 11: An MK-variant of BGV scheme [32]
- MKBGV.Setup(1λ , 1L, 1K ): Given the security parameter λ, a multiplicative depth L, and a
bound K on the number of keys, run the BGV.Setup function. Output the public parameters
pp = (d,q, t , χ ,ψ ,a) where a←Rℓq is the CRS vector.
- MKBGV.KeyGen(pp): Given the public parameters pp, run BGV.KeyGen to generate a key
pair (sk, pk) as sk = s ←ψ , and pk = (b = −as + te,a) where a←Rq and e ← χ .
- MKBGV.EvalKeyGen(sk): Given the secret sk = s, generate a helper component ek′ as a set
of ciphertexts encrypting each bit of secret key s and their encryption randomnesses under a
ring variant of GSW scheme, where messages are ring elements instead of bits. For 0 ≤ i < ℓ,
output the RGSW ciphertexts Θi = RGSW.Enc(pk,дi · s), Ψi = RGSW.Enc(pk,д−1(s)[i]).
Similarly, provide RGSW encryptions of the randomnesses ri , r ′i used in Ψi and Θi such
that Fi = RGSW.Enc(pk, ri ) and F ′i = RGSW.Enc(pk, r ′i ). Output the helper element as
ek′ = {(Θi , Fi ), (Ψi , F ′i )}i ∈{0, ..., ℓ−1}.
- MKBGV.Enc(pk,m): Given a message m ∈ Rt and a public key pk, perform BGV.Enc to
obtain the ciphertext as c = (c0, c1) ∈ R2q where c0 = rb +m + te0 and c1 = ra + te1. Assume
each participant has a unique index i and initiate an ordered set S = (i) for the ciphertext.
Output the fresh BGV ciphertext as the tuple cˆ = (c,S,L), where L is the initial level.
- MKBGV.Extend((pk1, . . . , pkK ), cˆ): To extend a BGV ciphertext to one encrypted under
a set of K users’ keys, simply set the ciphertext c as a concatenated K sub-vectors c¯ =
(c ′1, . . . ,c ′K ) ∈ R2Nql , such that c ′i = ci if the index i ∈ S, and c ′i = 0 otherwise. Update the
index set S and the level correspondingly.
- MKBGV.Eval(p¯k, f , c¯, c¯ ′): Given two extended ciphertexts c¯, c¯ ′ ∈ R2Kql encrypted under the
same concatenated key p¯k, perform homomorphic addition as c¯add = c¯ + c¯ ′ (mod q) and
homomorphic multiplication as c¯mult = c¯ ⊗ c¯ ′ (mod q).
- MKBGV.Relinearize({ek′1, . . . , ek′K }, c˜mult): Given a set of helper elements, generate an
evaluation key e¯k for the extended initial ciphertext product c¯mult as follows. For each user
1 ≤ k ≤ K , extend each RGSW encryption in ek′k to the other set of keys {pkj,k }1≤j≤K to
obtain e¯k′. Then, homomorphically compute e¯k = e¯k′ ⊗ e¯k′, which encrypts s¯k2. Use this
extended evaluation key to perform relinearization as c¯mult = BGV.Relinearize(e¯k, c¯mult).
- MKBGV.Dec((sk1, . . . , skK ), c¯): Given an extended ciphertext c¯, and the secret key s¯ con-
catenating all the secret keys of users in the set S. Decrypt as (⟨c¯, s¯⟩ (mod q)) (mod t) =
(∑Ki=1⟨c ′i , si ⟩ (mod q)) (mod t).
The scheme supports extending the ciphertexts to at most K keys. Let K ≤ K be the number
of participants who wish to compute with their keys. Each participant is assigned a unique index
i ∈ {1, . . . ,K} such their index is recorded in a special ordered set S for each ciphertext under the
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Fig. 10. MK-variant of the BGV scheme
corresponding key. Let c1 ∈ R2q be a BGV ciphertext encryptingm1 under the public key pk1. The
set for the ciphertext c1 is populated with the index 1 as S = (1) since the encryption is under the
first participant’s key pk1. Extending the ciphertext to a second key pk2 is done by constructing a
new ciphertext with two slots as c¯1 = (c ′1,c ′2) ∈ R4q . Each slot holds a sub-ciphertext corresponding
to the index set. In particular, we define c ′1 = c1 ∈ R2q as the original ciphertext since the index 1 ∈ S.
The second sub-ciphertext is initiated as zero c ′2 = (0, 0) ∈ R2q because the index 2 < S. The index
set is updated after the extension to include the new index S = (1, 2). In a similar manner, we can
further extend this ciphertext to additional K keys as illustrated in Fig. 10a. The size of the ciphertext
increases linearly with the number of keys such that for a ciphertext encrypted under K keys, we
have c¯ ∈ R2Kq .
Homomorphic evaluations can be performed on the extended ciphertexts. Given two ciphertexts
c¯1, c¯2 ∈ R4q encrypted under the same set of keys, their sum is obtained through slot-wise homomor-
phic addition c¯add = c¯1 + c¯2 ∈ R4q . Note that sub-ciphertexts in different slots do not interact directly
with each other. Rather, we perform slot-wise operations and the final result can be aggregated at the
decryption step as shown in the example in Fig. 10b. On the other hand, homomorphic multiplication
is done by performing tensor-product of the two ciphertexts. The initial product is a long ciphertext
c¯mult = c¯1 ⊗ c¯2 ∈ R16q that is encrypted under s¯ ⊗ s¯ instead of s¯. We need to apply key switching to
convert c¯mult to an encryption under s¯ and reduce its dimension to R4q . As mentioned in Sec. 3.3.1,
this process requires providing an evaluation key ek, which encrypts the long secret key s¯ ⊗ s¯. To
facilitate the generation of the evaluation key corresponding to the extended secret key, the scheme
proposes a ring-GSW scheme, which allows encrypting ring elements. Specifically, each participant
provides a GSW encryption of their secret key si such that each row can be viewed as a BGV cipher-
text. Then, these ciphertexts can be extended to their concatenated keys. Lastly, one homomorphic
multiplication is performed to obtain the encryption of s¯ ⊗ s¯ under the extended key that is used in
the key switching procedure.
The decryption process can be done with a two-round distributed decryption protocol similar to
previous schemes [23, 75, 80]. It requires all participants, whose indexes are in S, to collaborate in a
distributed decryption protocol. Each participant uses their secret key ski to decrypt the corresponding
sub-ciphertext c ′i . Observe that decryptions of zero sub-ciphertexts are cancelled and the final result
can be obtained through the aggregation of the decrypted BGV sub-ciphertexts.
Li et al. [66] proposed an alternative design for MKBGV scheme that reduced the size of extended
ciphertexts roughly by half. In particular, the dimension (number of ring elements) of ciphertext
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Fig. 11. Improved MK-variant of the BGV scheme with reduced ciphertexts
extended under K keys will be K + 1 instead of 2K . Recall that a BGV ciphertext has two components
c = (c0, c1) ∈ R2q , where c0 includes the message and c1 encodes the randomness used in encryption.
In the initial MKBGV scheme, the extended ciphertext under K keys has each slot holding two
ring elements as a full BGV ciphertext or padded with zeros (0, 0). Sub-ciphertexts still need to be
combined at decryption step. However, the new scheme follows a nested ciphertext design which
allocates the first slot of the extended ciphertext to the first ciphertext component c0 which holds
the message. Subsequent K slots are allocated to the second ciphertext component which holds the
randomness or padded with zero 0 as illustrated in Fig. 11a. For example, we can extend a ciphertext
c1, with a corresponding index set S = (1), to a second key pk2 as c¯1 = (c ′0, c ′1, c ′2) ∈ R3q such that
c ′0 = c0 and c
′
i = ci if i ∈ S or c ′i = 0 otherwise.
Homomorphic operations in this scheme are performed similar to the initial MKBGV scheme. An
example of homomorphic addition is shown in Fig. 11b. Homomorphic multiplication is performed
via tensor product. The generation of evaluation key is modified by combining operations between
GSW and BGV ciphertexts instead of between pair of GSW ciphertexts to reduce the space overhead.
The scheme also suggested a directed distributed decryption protocol to prevent all participants
from learning the decrypted result. In a nutshell, each participant sends their partial decryption to
the designated participant, who is intended to receive the result. This participant does not share
their partial decryption but collects all partial decryptions and combine them locally to retrieve the
message. This design enforces the dishonest-majority assumption since none of the participants is
able retrieve the message without having the partial decryption of the designated participant.
MK-variant of TFHE. The MKHE primitive remained abstract constructions that are not practical
for years. Chen, Chillotti, and Song [29] designed an MK variant of the TFHE scheme [36] and
provided the first proof-of-concept implementation of MKHE.
TFHE is an FHE over the torus T = R (mod 1) which supports the evaluation of a binary gate
followed by a fast bootstrapping procedure, which takes about 13ms. Its multi-key variant is multi-
hop and has the same functionality as the single-key TFHE. We provide a description in Scheme 12.
For the ring dimension d , we denote by R = Z[x]/(xd + 1) andT = T[x]/(xd + 1). The gadget toolkit
is defined in an approximate manner, i.e., for a gadget vector д ∈ Zℓ , the gadget decomposition is a
function д : T → Rℓ such that ⟨д−1(a),д⟩ ≈ a (mod 1) for all a ∈ T .
In the original TFHE, the bootstrapping procedure relied on the external product which takes a
pair of ring-GSW and RLWE ciphertexts as input and returns an RLWE ciphertext. Two MK variants
of the external product are proposed in [29]: the first approach is an improvement of the previous
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Scheme 12: An MK-variant of gate bootstrapping [29]
- MKTFHE.Setup(1λ): Given a security parameter λ, choose the RLWE dimension N and
the LWE dimension n. Set the LWE and RLWE error distributions χ ′ over T and χ over T ,
respectively. Sample an element a uniformly at random fromT ℓ . Output the public parameters
as pp = (n,N , χ ′, χ ,a). Set the RLWE and LWE gadget toolkits д ∈ Zℓ , д−1 : T → Rℓ and
д′ ∈ Zℓ′ , д′−1 : T→ Zℓ′ respectively.
- MKTFHE.KeyGen(pp): Sample the LWE secret t = (tj )0≤j<n ←{0, 1}n . Sample s =
(sj )0≤j<N ←{0, 1}N and set the RLWE secret as s = ∑j sjX j . Sample e ← χ ℓ and set the
public key as b = −s · a + e (mod 1). For 1 ≤ j ≤ n, generate BKj ← UniEnc(a, tj , s) and set
the bootstrapping key as BK = {BKj }1≤j≤n . Generate a key-switching key KS from s to t .
- MKTFHE.HomNAND(c¯1, c¯2, {bi ,BKi ,KSi }1≤i≤K ): For given two extended ciphertexts c¯i ∈
TnK+1 under the same extended secret key s¯k = (s1, . . . , sK ),
(1) c¯ ← (5/8, 0) − c¯1 − c¯2 (mod 1).
(2) Write c¯ = (b,a1, . . . ,aK ). Compute b˜ = ⌊2N · b⌉ and a˜i, j = ⌊2N · ai [j]⌉ for 1 ≤ i ≤ K and
1 ≤ j ≤ n.
(3) Let ACC←
(
1
8 (1 + X + · · · + XN−1) · XN /2+b˜ , 0
)
∈ TK+1
(4) For 1 ≤ i ≤ K and 1 ≤ j ≤ n, do ACC← CMux(ACC,x a˜i, j · ACC,BKi, j ).
(5) Write ACC as (∑0≤i<N b ′i · X i ,∑0≤j<N a′1, j · X j , . . . ,∑0≤j<N a′N , j · X j ), and let
c ′ =
(
1
8 + b
′
0,a
′
1,0,−a′1,N−1, . . . ,−a′1,1, . . . ,a′K,0,−a′K,1, . . . ,−a′K,N−1
)
∈ TNK+1.
(6) Perform the key-switching from (s1, . . . , sK ) to (t1, . . . , tK ) using {KSi }1≤i≤K , and return
the output ciphertext in TnK+1.
ciphertext extension technique of [75] and the other is a new solution which does not require the
precomputation of extended ciphertexts. Instead, the involved parties’ evaluation keys directly act
on the corresponding elements of extended ciphertext during bootstrapping. In the following, we
describe the second method which has advantages in terms of noise growth and complexity. Each
party generates a public key bi ≈ −s · a (mod 1) which is taken as an input of the external product.
We write b0 = −a for the simplicity.
- UniEnc(a, µ, si ): The CRS a ∈ Rℓq , message µ and the i-th secret si are given as input. Sample
ri ←ψ , f i,1 uniformly at random from Rℓq , and ei,1,ei,2 ← χ ℓ . Return the uni-encryption
Ci = (di , f i,0, f i,1) where di = ri · a + ei,1 + µ · д (mod 1) and f i,0 = −si · f i,1 + ei,2 + ri · д
(mod 1).
- ExtProd(c¯,Ci , {bi }0≤i≤K ): Given an uni-encryption Ci = (di , f i,0, f i,1) and an extended
RLWE ciphertext c¯ = (ci )0≤i≤K and the set of public keys {bi }0≤i≤K , compute and return the
ciphertext c¯ ′ = (c ′0, . . . , c ′K ) ∈ RK+1q as follows:
(1) Compute uj = ⟨д−1(c j ),d j ⟩, vj = ⟨д−1(c j ),b j ⟩, w j,0 = ⟨д−1(vj ), f i,0⟩, and ⟨д−1(vj ), f i,1⟩ for
all 0 ≤ j ≤ K .
(2) Compute c ′0 = u0 +
∑
0≤j≤K w j,0 (mod 1), c ′i = ui +
∑
0≤j≤K w j,1 (mod 1) and c ′j = uj for
j , i.
We will denote the external product by ExtProd(c¯,Ci , {bi }0≤i≤K ) = c¯ ⊡ Ci . Similar to the TFHE
scheme, we can define a multi-key variant of the CMUX gate using the MK external product above.
For given two MK RLWE ciphertexts c¯0, c¯1 and an uni-encryption Ci of µ ∈ {0, 1} from the i-th
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party, it returns the RLWE ciphertext CMux(c¯0, c¯1,Ci ) = c¯0 + (c¯1 − c¯0) ⊡Ci encrypting the same
message as c¯µ .
A MK-variant of the gate bootstrapping was constructed by replacing the external product and
cmux gate of TFHE by their MK variants described above. The final multi-key-switching step is
done by repeating the single key-switching procedure on individual ciphertext entries.
MK-variant of BFV/CKKS. Chen et al. [30] introduced MK variants of the BFV and CKKS schemes.
A ciphertext corresponding to the tuple of K secrets s¯ = s1, . . . , sK is the form of c¯ = (c0, . . . , cK ) ∈
RK+1q where c0 +
∑
i ci · si is a randomized encoding of the underlying plaintext.
Different from the MKBGV scheme [32], the authors proposed a new relinearization algorithm
which does not require any precomputation on the evaluation keys. To be precise, homomorphic
multiplication between c¯1, c¯2 ∈ RK+1q first computes cˆ = c¯1 ⊗ c¯2 ∈ R(K+1)
2
q , and then perform the
relinearization procedure on the entries of cˆ = (cˆi, j )0≤i, j≤K . Each relinearization procedure on
cˆi, j requires only two evaluation keys from the parties i and j. As a result, the complexity grows
quadratically with the number of involved parties K .
In the following, we first describe the common relinearization method and then provide the
descriptions of MKBFV and MKCKKS in Schemes 13 and 14, respectively. The public key of the
i-th party is denoted by pk = bi ∈ Rℓq .
- RelinKeyGen(a, si ): For the CRS a ∈ Rℓq and the secret si , sample ri ←ψ . Sample di,1
uniformly at random from Rℓq and errors ei,1,ei,2 from χ
ℓ . Return the relinearization key
rlki = (di,0,di,1,di,2) where di,0 = −si ·di,1+ei,1+ri ·д (mod q) and di,2 = ri ·a+ei,2+si ·д
(mod q).
- Relinearize({pki , rlki }1≤i≤K , cˆ): Given a ciphertext cˆ = (ci, j )0≤i, j≤K and the set of public
and relinearization keys pki = bi , rlki = (di,0,di,1,di,2), compute and return the ciphertext
c ′ = (c ′0, . . . , c ′K ) ∈ RK+1q as follows:
(1) Initialize the ciphertext c ′ as c ′0 ← c0,0 and ci ← ci,0 + c0,i (mod q) for 1 ≤ i ≤ K .
(2) For 1 ≤ i, j ≤ K , do c ′i, j ← ⟨д−1(ci, j ),b j ⟩ (mod q), (c ′0, c ′i ) ← (c ′0, c ′i ) + д−1(c ′i, j ) · [di,0 |di,1]
(mod q), and c ′j ← c ′j + ⟨д−1(ci, j ),di,2⟩ (mod q).
It is also presented in [30] how to perform the rotation operation on the plaintext slots using an MK
variant of the key-switching technique. Moreover, the authors extended the bootstrapping methods of
BFV and CKKS into the MK case. We refer the reader to the original manuscript for more details
and experimental results.
5.3 Hybrid Multi-key Homomorphic Encryption
The proportional increase in ciphertext size remains a bottleneck for efficient MKHE schemes. The
size of a ciphertext grows correspondingly to the number of involved participants’ keys. This may
pose an efficiency limitation in many outsourced computation scenarios with a large number of
participants. Suppose we have a system with N model owners and P clients. The model owners
want collaborate and jointly compute on their trained models or functions and evaluate their client’s
requests. The model owners want to keep their sensitive models private, so they encrypt them under
their individual keys and delegate them to a cloud. The cloud evaluates these encrypted models but
should not learn anything from them. In this system, both model owners and clients want to protect
their inputs under their keys.
Leveraging MKHE schemes for this scenario will require each ciphertext to be extended to
N + 1 different keys (i.e., the model owners keys plus the key of the requesting client) before any
computation. The efficiency of the system is affected, especially if the number of model owners is
large because it proportionally increases the ciphertext size. On the other hand, one may leverage
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Scheme 13: An MK-variant of BFV scheme [30]
- MKBFV.Setup(1λ): Given a security parameter λ, choose the RLWE dimension n, the cipher-
text module q, and the plaintext module t . Set the error distribution χ and the key distribution
ψ over R. Sample a random vector a←Rℓq . Output the public parameters pp = (n,q, t , χ ,ψ ,a).
- MKBFV.KeyGen(pp): Given the public parameters, sample s ←ψ and e ←Rℓq , and let b =
−a · s + e (mod q). Output the key pair as (pk = b, sk = s). Run rlk←RelinKeyGen(a, s) to
generate a relinearization key.
- MKBFV.Enc(pk,m): Given a public key pk = b, let b = b[0] and a = a[0]. Sample r ←ψ and
e0, e1 ← χ . Compute the ciphertext as c = r · (b,a) + (∆m + e0, e1) ∈ Rq , where ∆ = ⌊q/t⌉.
- MKBFV.Add(c¯1, c¯2): For given two extended ciphertexts under the same extended secret key
s¯k = (s1, . . . , sK ), output c¯add = c¯1 + c¯2 ∈ RK+1q .
- MKBFV.Mult({pki , rlki }1≤i≤K , c¯1, c¯2): Compute cˆmult = ⌊t/q⌉ (c¯1⊗c¯2) ∈ R(K+1)
2
q and return
the ciphertext c¯mult = Relinearize({pki , rlki }1≤i≤K , cˆmult) ∈ RK+1q .
- MKBFV.Dec((sk1, . . . , skK ), c¯): Given a set of secret keys and an extended ciphertext c¯ =
(c0, c1, . . . , cK ), set the extended secret key as s¯k = (1, sk1, . . . , skK ) and output
⌊⌊t/q⌉ ⟨c¯, s¯k⟩⌉
(mod t).
Scheme 14: An MK-variant of CKKS scheme [30]
- MKCKKS.Setup(1λ): Given a security parameter λ, choose the RLWE dimension n and a
chain of ciphertext moduli q0 < q1 < · · · < qL . Assume q =∏Li=0 pi for some integers pi , such
that qℓ =
∏ℓ
i=0 pi . Set the error distribution χ and the key distributionψ over R. Uniformly
choose a random vector a←Rℓq . Output the public parameters as pp = (n,q, χ ,ψ ,a).
- MKCKKS.KeyGen(pp): Given the public parameters, sample s ←ψ and e ← χ ℓ , and let
b = −a · s + e (mod q). Output the key pair as (pk = b, sk = s).
- MKCKKS.Enc(pk,m): Given a public key pk = b, let b = b[0] and a = a[0]. Sample r ← χk
and e0, e1 ← χ , and return the ciphertext c = r · (b,a) + (m + e0, e1) ∈ R2q .
- MKCKKS.Eval(p¯k, f , c¯1, c¯2): Given two extended ciphertexts under the same extended secret
key s¯k = (s1, . . . , sK ) at level ℓ for K the number of involved parties, perform homomorphic
evaluation as follows. For addition, c¯add = c¯1 + c¯2 ∈ RK+1qℓ . For multiplication, compute
cˆmult = c¯1 ⊗ c¯2 ∈ R(K+1)
2
qℓ . Perform the relinearization and return the ciphertext c¯mult =
Relinearize({pki , rlki }1≤i≤K , cˆmult) ∈ RK+1q .
- MKCKKS.Rescale(c¯): Given a ciphertext c¯ = (c0, . . . , cK ) ∈ RK+1qℓ at level ℓ, compute c ′i =⌊
p−1
ℓ
ci
⌉
for 0 ≤ i ≤ K and return the re-scaled ciphertext c¯ ′ = (c ′0, . . . , c ′K ) ∈ RK+1qℓ−1
- MKCKKS.Dec((sk1, . . . , skK ), c¯): Given a set of secret keys and an extended ciphertext c¯ =
(c0, c1, . . . , cK ) ∈ Rqℓ , set the extended secret key as s¯k = (1, sk1, . . . , skK ) and output ⟨c¯, s¯k⟩
(mod qℓ).
ThHE schemes which compute under a joint key generated from participants keys. However, this
approach is also not practical because we need to generate a joint key for every client and the group
of N model owners; that is, we will need to produce and maintain P joint keys. This requirement also
means that each model owner has to provide P copies of the model, each encrypted under one of the
P joint keys, to the Cloud. Moreover, if there is any change (adding or removing) in the participants
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requires generating a new joint key and re-encrypting all ciphertexts with this new joint key, which is
inefficient.
To address this issue, Aloufi and Hu [4] proposed a hybrid approach (MKHE+) based on the BGV
scheme [22]. The scheme supports homomorphic computation over ciphertexts encrypted under
multi-key and produces small ciphertexts. The approach combines the advantages of both ThHE and
MKHE techniques to reduce computation complexity and ciphertext size. We present the MKHE+
scheme in Scheme 5.3.
Scheme 15: A Threshold MKHE scheme [4]
- MKHE+.Setup(1λ , 1L, 1K ): Given the security parameter λ, a multiplicative depth L, and a
bound K on the number of keys, run the BGV.Setup and output pp = (R, χ ,q,a, t) where
a←Rℓq is the CRS vector.
- MKHE + .KeyGen(pp: Given the public parameters pp, choose a←a and generate a key pair
(pkMi , skMi ) for each model owner Mi where i ∈ {1, . . . ,N } and (pkCi , skCi ) for each clientC. Then for the set of model owners, generate a joint key pkM as in ThBGV.JointKeyGen.
- MKHE + .Enc(pk,m): Each model owner encrypts their model under the joint key pkM and
delegate them to the evaluator (if in outsourced system model, see Fig. 1c). The client encrypts
their input under their public key pkC .
- MKHE + .Extend((pkM , pkC),c): When evaluation is requested, the evaluator first extends
each ciphertext under the set of the two keys p¯k = (pkM , pkC) using the algorithm
MKBGV.Extend((pk1, . . . , pkN ),c) described in the MKBGV scheme.
- MKHE + .EvalKeyGen(skMi , skC): Given a set of model owners’ secret keys and the client
secret key, first generate a joint helper element ek′M (in a threshold manner) and a helper
element ek′C as in MKBGV.EvalKeyGen.
- MKHE + .Eval(c¯1, c¯2): Computations now can be done on extended ciphertexts c¯, c¯2 that are
encrypted under the same extended key p¯k. The homomorphic addition of two extended
ciphertexts is performed as element-wise addition, and the homomorphic multiplication is
performed as the tensor product.
- MKHE + .Relinearize(ek′M , ek′C, c¯mult): Given a two helper elements, generate the extended
evaluation key e¯k for the extended initial ciphertext product and apply the key switching
technique as described in MKBGV.Relinearize to reduce the dimension and allow further
homomorphic operations.
- MKHE + .Dec((skM , skC), c¯): Given an extended ciphertext that is encrypted under the ex-
tended key p¯k = (pkM , pkC), invoke the distributed decryption protocol between the model
owners and the client to perform the decryption as the following algorithm, Dec(s¯, c¯) =
(⟨cC, sC⟩ +∑Ni=1⟨cM , sMi ⟩ (mod q)) (mod t).
The fundamental observation in MKHE+ is that the group of model owners do not often change
and is likely to remain the same during the evaluation for each client. Hence, it is better to generate
one joint key pkM , using the ThHE key setup, for the model owners group to encrypt their models
under this joint key. On the other hand, client’s request can be dynamic as clients can come and go;
therefore, a client can encrypt their data under their own key pkC . This way the number of keys we
are computing with becomes two keys – the model owner’s joint key pkM and the client’s key pkC .
At evaluation, the Cloud dynamically extends the ciphertexts to the concatenated key p¯k =
(pkM , pkC). More specifically, each encrypted model is transformed from a ciphertext under one
joint key into one encrypted under two keys, i.e., the joint key and the client’s key. Similarly, the
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encrypted client’s request is extended to the model owners’ joint key. Homomorphic evaluations are
done in a similar manner as described in Sec. 5.2.3. One core difference is that model owners also
need to collaborate to jointly generate the evaluation key corresponding to the joint key pkM to be
used in the homomorphic multiplication. This can be done in an additional round as proposed by
Asharov et al. [8] which we discuss in Sec. 5.1. Similar to ThHE and MKHE schemes, the hybrid
scheme requires invoking a distributed decryption protocol so participants can jointly decrypt the
encrypted result.
This hybrid approach combines ThHE and MKHE techniques to remove the requirement of
generating a joint key for every client with the model owners. It also produces short extended
ciphertexts since the number of involved keys is two instead of K + 1, which is adequate in scenarios
where K > 2, the number of model owners is large.
6 OPEN RESEARCH PROBLEMS
In this survey, we reviewed different techniques that support homomorphic computation on data
contributed by different owners and encrypted using different encryption keys. We categorized these
techniques into the single-key and multi-key approaches, as illustrated in Fig. 3.
Selecting the right scheme for an application depends on the system design and requirements.
For example, if the application goal is to share encrypted input between a set of authorized users, it
is better to leverage PRE schemes, or IBE/ABE schemes if fine-grained access control is required.
For outsourced computations, such as training an ML model based on data contributed by multiple
parties without leaking them, multi-key approaches is more suitable. It may be a better choice to
leverage ThHE schemes in this case if participants do not change often. If they do, the efficiency
quickly degrades because the joint key needs to be updated accordingly. In this case, MKHE schemes
is more flexible to enable on-the-fly computations. Based on our observations and lesson-learned, we
share open research problems and our view on methods that may overcome these problems.
6.1 Distributed decryption
In multi-key approaches discussed in Sec. 5, ciphertexts are encrypted under multiple keys – a joint
key generated from multiple keys in ThHE or a concatenation of those keys in MKHE. Both ThHE
and MKHE schemes share a similar requirement where all involved parties must collaborate for
decryption. A trusted party can perform centralized decryption on behalf of involved parties, but
it must have access to all secret keys. This setting may not secure, especially with the increase of
security breaches. Alternatively, a distributed decryption based on MPC protocol (see Sec. 3.3.3)
can be invoked such that each participant partially decrypts the ciphertext with their own secret
key. All participants then combine the partial decryptions to retrieve the message. In this setting,
all participants learn the final decrypted result. To add an extra layer of security, the distributed
decryption protocol can be made directed. This means only one intended participant can learn the
result by keeping their partial decryption private and be the last one to perform the decryption step.
One way to render a non-interactive decryption protocol is to key switch the ciphertext’s key to the
intended participant’s key before returning the result. But, the key switching step is interactive, as
further elaborated in Sec. 6.2.
In the outsourced system model (in Fig. 1c), the Cloud evaluator may return the resulting ciphertext
to the client, who then invokes the distributed decryption protocol with other participants. This setting
does not involve the Cloud in the decryption step. On the other hand, the Cloud can help and invoke
the distributed decryption by sending the ciphertext directly to the other participants to perform
partial decryption and return the partially decrypted ciphertext to the client, as illustrated in Fig. 12a.
The client then completes the decryption with their own secret key to retrieve the result. This design
involves moving a large ciphertext, containing two large components, among participants. The design
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Fig. 12. Overview of different approaches for distributed decryption protocol
can be improved, as illustrated in Fig. 12b. The Cloud returns the full ciphertext to the clients and
sends only the randomness component to the participants who use their secret keys to generate
decryption components and send them to the client who completes the decryption step by combining
the received components. Note the improved method may have additional round of communication,
but it suits scenarios with a large number of participants because it avoids forwarding large partially
decrypted ciphertexts between participants.
6.2 A combination of multi-key techniques
Most of our surveyed multi-key approaches are designed by adding extra protocols on top of some
base HE schemes. These extra protocols include PRE which enables switching the key of a given
ciphertext to another key without revealing the plaintext, IBE/ABE which provides access control for
the homomorphic computation. ThHE and MKHE support computation with ciphertexts encrypted,
respectively, under joint and concatenated keys. An interesting observation is that some of these
features, such as PRE and ThHE, can be combined to obtain an encryption scheme with a more
efficient design.
As mentioned earlier, PRE can be integrated with multi-key schemes such as ThHE and MKHE to
avoid distributed decryption. The idea is to key switch the ciphertext from a join or concatenated key
to the intended client’s key. Although this method remove the interactiveness within the decryption
step, it still requires all participants to collaboratively generate a re-encryption key in advance either
based on their secret or public key. Mouchet et al. [74] proposed methods for performing a distributed
re-encryption key generation and distributed key-switching techniques.
Alternatively, we can develop hybrid MKHE approach [4] based on ThHE and MKHE techniques
to obtain a more practical design with shorter extended ciphertexts. More specifically, this approach
is more suitable for computation outsourcing scenarios where a fixed group of data owners wanting
to offer data-driven services to customers. In this system model, the group membership of data
owners does not change often hence ThHE can used to create a joint key, whereas MKHE can support
dynamic extension of this joint key to a customer’s key, as we discussed in Sec. 5.3. Unfortunately, the
research work on this approach is still scarce. More work is needed to address other system models
with one group of users. Another open research question is how to achieve more generalized and
dynamic hybrid schemes, specifically in cases where participants often change. One may investigate
the generation of joint keys for subsets of participants and allow the cloud to use PRE and switch
on-the-fly to a less number of concatenated keys to obtain shorter extended ciphertexts.
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6.3 Public parameters
To facilitate computing with multiple keys in LWE-based schemes, it is common to design them
in the CRS model. That is, participants use a publicly shared parameter in the form of a lattice (or
ring in RLWE) element and use it in generating their public keys. This is to ensure that all keys are
related, which is a requirement for correct elimination of large lattice elements during decryption.
One disadvantage of this model is that it often relies on a trusted party to uniformly choose the
shared element before any computation is done. Even with removing this trusted party and generating
independent public keys [64], we still need to perform a linking algorithm on the keys to make
them related. This linking algorithm is held at run time and is interactive, which increases both
computation and communication overheads. Hence, a research question still stands as if we can
compute efficiently with multiple keys without relying on public parameters.
Another form of public parameters that must be provided is encrypted randomness in GSW-based
MKHE schemes and evaluation keys in BV-based MKHE schemes. In the MK-variants of GSW
scheme, there is no need to provide evaluation keys. However, decrypting an extended ciphertext
with concatenated keys fails if no information about the encryption randomness was provided. Hence,
it is crucial to include additional encrypted randomness components within the extended ciphertext.
Because of this requirement, the size of the ciphertexts increases quadratically at worst case [75, 80],
which leads to compute on significantly high-dimensional matrices. Even with proposed optimizations
using bootstrapping [23] to obtain linearly increased size, we need to bootstrap at each evaluation
and the initial evaluated ciphertexts have quadratic growth.
On the other hand, MK-variants of BV schemes do not require encrypting the randomness, but
they need providing evaluation keys to apply relinearization after each homomorphic multiplication
as discussed in Sec. 3.3.1. Generating the evaluation keys corresponding to the concatenated key is
not a trivial task. In earlier works proposed by Chen et al. [32] and Li et al. [66], this task requires
combining different schemes, namely BGV and ring-GSW. However, Chen et al. [30] proposed that
relinearization can be applied directly on extended ciphertexts with individually generated evaluation
keys.
7 APPLICATIONS
Many outsourced computations involve sensitive data contributed by individual data owners. HE
protects this sensitive data in-use without requiring decryption first. Multi-key HE extends the
protection of private data to individual owners, with each possesses a private key for decrypting
his/her inputs and results but nothing else from others. There are many applications that can benefit
from multi-key HE. We classify these applications based on the two system models described in
Section 1.1.
7.1 Computation outsourced to a cloud evaluator
Nowadays, large-scale data analysis and machine learning tasks are outsourced to the Cloud for its
compelling economic efficiency and wide accessibility. Outsourcing these computational-intensive
tasks to the Cloud where the homomorphically encrypted data resides can reduce the overheads of
moving large ciphertext around. Many existing work proposed homomorphic algorithms based on
this system model.
CryptoNets [57] and CryptoDL [62] are earlier works on supporting secure inference of encrypted
neural networks that are outsourced to the Cloud. These works assumed a system model in which
both network parameters and feature inputs are contributed by the same owner who just wants to
offload data storage and computations to the cloud, hence these initial works assumed private data is
Manuscript submitted to ACM CSUR.
50 Aloufi et al.
encrypted under a single key. However, this setup is not suitable in a collaborative setting where each
data owner wants to protect their private data using their own keys, as illustrated in Fig. 1c.
Wang et al. [98] proposed a framework with two non-colluding servers A,B to support homo-
morphic computation on ciphertexts encrypted under different keys. The core idea is based on proxy
re-encryption (PRE) which has been discussed in Section 4.2. The framework leverages one of two
proposed ElGamal variant schemes, Vitamin+ and Vitamin∗, to support partial homomorphic evalua-
tion (addition or multiplication) on ciphertexts. In the Vitamin+ scheme, server A can independently
perform addition on ciphertexts but needs to interact with server B to perform multiplication on the
blinded messages. In particular, users encrypt their messages with their keys and send ciphertexts to
the server A. The server A converts ciphertexts from under users’ public keys to ones encrypted
under the public key of server B and locally perform homomorphic addition on ciphertexts under
the same key. To evaluate multiplication, ciphertexts are first blinded and sent to the server B who
decrypts and perform multiplication of blinded messages in the plain. Then, the server B encrypts
the product with its key and returns it. The server A can then remove the blinding factor and con-
vert ciphertext results back to ones encrypted under users’ keys. The same process follows in the
Vitamin∗ scheme but with changing the operations. The re-encryption and blinding operations are
required due to the use of ElGamal variant schemes which cannot support homomorphic addition and
multiplication on ciphertexts. These operations add significant overhead impacting the practicality
of this framework. Also, many existing works explore the use of partial HE schemes to support
homomorphic computation in a two-party setting (Fig.1a). These solutions typically have limitations
making them not straightforward to be generalized.
Nevertheless, the idea of using PRE to transform ciphertexts encrypted under one key to another
has been adopted in later works [83, 104] to avoid the need of a trusted crypto server for decryption
or invoking a distributed decryption. For example, the work of [104] leverages an MK-variant of
BGV scheme to extend ciphertexts to multiple keys before evaluation. The ciphertext result, which is
encrypted under concatenated keys, can be then converted via key switching to the receiver’s public
key so it is decryptable directly with the corresponding secret key.
Hu et al. [63] proposed homomorphic algorithms for evaluating geosocial query with user-
controlled privacy on the Cloud. The authors proposed a system model that allows users to submit
periodically encrypted geo-location data to a cloud evaluator (i.e., service provider). The cloud
evaluator performs homomorphic evaluation of location queries upon receiving users’ requests. In
this case, the data privacy of individual users needs to be protected with multi-key approaches. The
authors leveraged the idea of ThHE (Sec. 5.1) to support homomorphic evaluation with multiple
keys and proposed the use of a semi-trusted crypto server to create joint public key using individual
public key from each pair of users. Users encrypt their location data using this joint key. The homo-
morphically evaluated results are then sent to the crypto server for decryption, or passed around all
involved parties for a distributed decryption. This work inherits the limitation of ThHE, and it is not
salable to a large number of users.
Aloufi et al. [5] proposed homomorphic protocols for blindfolded evaluation of random forests
that are assembled from collaborating model owners. Each model owner encrypts their decision
trees under their keys and outsource them to the Cloud evaluator. The authors proposed the use of
the hybrid MKHE (Sec. 5.3) to reduce the number of joint keys needed for encrypting the models
while preserving the ability to dynamically extend the encrypted models to a user’s public key just
before evaluation. Similar design has been proposed by Chen et al. [30] for oblivious neural network
inference based on encrypted inputs under multiple owners’ keys. Both work require the semi-honest
cloud to work with individual model owners to perform a MPC-based distributed decryption protocol.
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7.2 Computation among multi-party
Earlier schemes, namely LTV [69] and Clear-McGoldrick [37], extended HE schemes to the multi-
key setting. However, they assumed the existence of a trusted party that has access to all secret keys
and can decrypt the evaluated result at the end. This setting is not feasible when multiple participants
do not want to disclose their secret keys. Mukherjee and Wichs [75] laid the first construction of a
two-round MPC protocol that leverages MKHE evaluations and enable distributed decryption. In
the first round, each participant encrypts their inputs under their individually generated keys and
broadcasts the ciphertexts. In the second round, each participant locally extends the ciphertexts to the
additional keys (Sec. 5.2) and homomorphically evaluates the algorithm. Then, each participant uses
their secret key to decrypt the locally evaluated result and broadcasts this partially decrypted result
to other participants. At the end, all participants aggregate all partial decrypted result and obtain
the final result. The protocol avoids delegating secret keys to a trusted party, but it requires all the
parties to have access to the evaluated algorithm in order to concurrently compute the same algorithm
on ciphertexts. Building on top of this construction, Gavin and Bonnevay [53] proposed a system
to securely aggregate testimonies from different parties in which some parties may be colluded to
perturb the results. Another secure data aggregation protocol were proposed for Vehicular ad-hoc
networks (VANETs) [73].
Technically, it is possible to extended most (R)LWE based HE schemes to a multiparty setting
using a universal thresholdizer [16]. The construction is based on the linear secret sharing of key as
in ThHE (Sec. 5.1). For example, Mouchet et al. [74] proposed the construction of the multiparty
variant of recent (R)LWE-based schemes such as BFV [21, 48] and CKKS [34]. Fundamentally,
this work shares many similarities with other ThHE scheme. Hence, it requires the collaboration
of all parties to decrypt the evaluated results or performs a collaborative key switching protocol to
transform the evaluation results encrypted under a joint key to a ciphertext that is decryptable by the
user’s secret key.
Clinical and Genomic data is typically locked up on secure servers of individual data owners
such as hospitals, biobanks. Due to privacy regulations (e.g. HIPAA, GDPR), these data owners are
reluctant to outsource any private data to a third-party. Medco [83] combined HE with MPC protocol
to facilitate federated processing of homomorphic encrypted data that is on-premises of individual
data owners. Medco adopted ThHE to support multi-key HE, assuming the membership of these data
owners does not change often. Hence, they can setup a joint public key for clients to encrypt their
inputs. Note, the client inputs are protected since no single data owner can decrypt without the joint
secret key which are generated using partial secret keys owned by each data owner. The encrypted
client queries are sent to each data owner for homomorphic evaluation. The evaluated results are
verified and passed through a distributed decryption protocol which converts the final results to be
encrypted under only the client’s key.
8 CONCLUSION
Many secure computation applications requires stronger security models where data are protected
under different keys. In this survey, we reviewed existing techniques that support this model of
computation. We categorized the techniques, based on the number of keys involved in the encryption,
to single-key and multi-key approaches. Single-key approaches encrypt and process data then enable
an authorized user to independently decrypt with their key. On the other hand, multi-key approaches
enable a set of users to construct one joint key based on their individual keys as in ThHE schemes, or
dynamically extends their individually encrypted data to multiple keys as in MKHE schemes. More
recent techniques support combining different techniques for specific system models for efficiency.
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We also analyzed the security and complexity of different existing schemes and discussed open
problems in this emerging research area.
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